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Elliott Newton 
CAPTIVITY AND CONVERSION: AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF SOVIET POWS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
In this thesis, I examine both internal and external pressures Soviet prisoners of war (POWs) 
experienced prior to their defection and while in captivity. I discuss several driving factors, such 
as Soviet propaganda tactics, pre-deployment military training, quality of life in Afghanistan, 
human rights violations, ethnic conflicts and ritualistic hazing (dedovshchina or starikovshchina) 
that influenced Soviet soldiers to defect from the Red Army. In addition, I observe what issues 
most compelled some of these soldiers to convert to Islam and settle in Afghanistan rather than 
return to their homes in the Soviet Union or seek asylum in the West following their release. 
These factors include the historical treatment of Soviet POWs and psychological trauma. The 
historical Soviet treatment of POWs played an influential role in the defectors’ decisions and 
why many were afraid to return to their homeland years after the conflict had ended. 
Psychological trauma resulting from violence against non-combatants seems to have fostered 
Soviet soldiers’ sympathy and respect for the Afghan population before their capture or 
defection.  
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“It has so turned out that no one needs us. The Soviet Union rejected us because it 
makes believe that there are no POWs here, and it does nothing to help. The 
United States always wants specific proof beforehand that the Soviet soldiers will 
be good, while…other countries like Pakistan are too afraid…” Vladislav 
Naumov, Soviet army deserter in Afghanistan, March 1986 (Thorne 1986, 1)  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
At the outset of the Soviet invasion in December 1979, 17 million people resided in 
Afghanistan. However, as a result of the war, 5.5 million Afghans fled abroad as refugees and 
another 2.2 million became “internal refugees” within the country (Grau 2004, 135). Over 1.3 
million Afghans died, mostly civilians (Grau 2004, 150). High casualties among the Afghans 
were detrimental to Afghan society, as the casualties constituted a significant portion of the 
population. Casualties were also high on the Soviet side. “It has been determined that during the 
ten years of war, the war dead of the 40th Army exceeded 36,000, including 3,000 officers” (The 
Russian General Staff 2002, 43). 
Despite this, the USSR lost the war when the political conflict morphed into a 
psychological one. As discontent grew, soldiers deserted more frequently. Some of these 
defectors objected to the lifestyle in the Red Army. Conditions were difficult, as disease and 
casualties were common. It was not until after an examination of official figures released in 1993 
that the world discovered the Soviet Union “significantly undercounted” casualty figures in 
Afghanistan (The Russian General Staff 2002, 48 and Кривошеев 1993). Intense censorship and 
long deployments meant many soldiers were bored and unhappy with their situation. Numerous 
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Soviet troops turned to alcohol or drugs to remedy this despondency. Additionally, according to 
soldiers’ personal accounts, they were horrified at the violence and degradation present within 
the army structure. New recruits were completely unprepared for their military mission. Upon 
their arrival, they were misused and beaten, and Central Asian soldiers were mortified and 
humiliated. This violence spread into the army’s war tactics as Afghan civilians were maliciously 
targeted and human rights violated. Many Soviet troops could not handle the pressure and 
escaped from what they once considered their internationalist duty.  
Some of these soldiers, several of whom we will meet in the coming pages, failed to ever 
return to the USSR or to seek refuge in the West. Instead, they built new homes and new lives 
for themselves in Afghanistan. Many of these troops were simply too afraid to return to the 
Soviet Union. They knew the mistreatment most POWs (prisoners of war) received at the hands 
of the Soviet government and remembered the horrors of the gulags following WWII. Some 
remained, like Vladislav Naumov, because they felt the Soviet government had abandoned them 
and they had no other option.  These soldiers decided it would be best to simply assimilate with 
their old foes and begin anew. Other defectors felt a much deeper connection to the Afghan 
people. These troops embraced Islam, and many even took up arms alongside the Mujahedeen. 
These soldiers took the cause of Afghanistan as their own, vowing to defend it with their lives. 
One such soldier, Gennady Tseuma, eagerly married a local woman and rejected his old life in 
the Soviet Union. He would never see his parents alive again. Many of these ex-Soviets made a 
psychological connection with their captors. As I show in this thesis, these defectors welcomed 
Islam to fill what they felt to be the religious void in their communist lifestyle and sincerely 
believed the Afghan people could provide them with a better future than life in their own 
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country. Men like Gennady Tesuma and Bakhretdin Khakimov felt Afghanistan gave them what 
the USSR never could: an accepting home filled with religious peace and sincerity.  
 
SOURCES AND METHODS 
Numerous sources on the fate of Soviet POWs in Afghanistan exist. I have collected 
primary language sources where possible and a large amount of information from news 
organizations such as TIME magazine and the BBC. Though I found substantial evidence of 
violence and abuse within the POW accounts, I wanted to ensure that the information was not 
due strictly to bias. In 2006-2008 I traveled to the Russian cities of Kemerovo, Omsk, 
Novokuznetsk, and Novosibirsk. Later, in 2013, I visited Dushanbe, Tajikistan where I 
interviewed former Soviet Central Asian soldiers about their experiences in Afghanistan and Red 
Army life in general. Many details about Soviet misconduct in Afghanistan were taken from 
Vladislav Tamarov’s book, Afghanistan: A Russian Soldier’s Story, which details his 
experiences in Afghanistan while serving in the Soviet Army. It is important to note that 
although Tamarov lives in St. Petersburg today, he has no qualms writing about the morally 
problematic actions he saw and did. Tamarov did not write a biased memoir as an ex-patriate; 
rather, what he wrote appears to have been open and honest information that he felt needed to be 
made public. Finally, I conducted extensive research on Stockholm syndrome and PTSD from 
psychological journals. Such research suggests that POW experiences in Afghanistan made these 
men susceptible to adopting Afghanistan following their release from captivity.  
The majority of my research stems from published or broadcast interviews with these 
POWs. These interviews include those which Lyudmila Thorne conducted in Afghanistan from 
1983 to 1986, writer Ivan Watson (from NPR)’s interviews with Gennady Tseuma in 2006, and a 
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2012 Russia Today documentary on the life of Tseuma in Afghanistan and his journey home to 
see his relatives. I sought to collect as many stories as possible from various POWs, over a 
period of time to see how their perspectives changed with time. Gennady Tseuma’s story is the 
longest-document case study, as I was able to gather interviews with him from the 1980s until 
present. Rodric Braithwaite, in his book Afghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89, 
describes conditions in which soldiers fought this war. He was thorough in his collection of 
primary sources on the war and provided valuable details regarding the lives of many of these 
POWs. 
 
PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE WAR 
 Unsurprisingly, Soviet media coverage of events in Afghanistan was highly skewed in 
favor of the U.S.S.R. Contrary to the American media’s portrayal of Afghanistan, the Soviet 
Union attempted to paint a rose-colored picture of the war during the initial years (History 
Channel 2008). According to the Communist Party, “the Soviet invasion was forced, but a 
necessary measure. Due to US and Western expansion, the government decision [was based on 
choosing] between a pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Republic and the chaos of Islamic 
fundamentalism” (Translated from Коммунисты Петербурга и Ленинградской Области 
2014). The U.S.S.R. was thus depicted as the champion of every helpless Afghan peasant. The 
number of mounting fatalities was buried deep beneath the state socialist façade of patronizing 
collaboration, and the Soviet people had very little information about the war their government 
was fighting and the soldiers serving abroad. However, the Soviet news cover-up and the 
surmounting casualties at the war front became impossible for the regime to conceal from the 
Soviet populous.  
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The People and the War 
For the first six years of the war, the Soviet media managed to keep a lid on internal 
reporting of the war in Afghanistan and hindered foreign news outlets from reporting on the 
events. During the 1980 Olympics in Moscow, veterans from the war were not allowed to attend 
the games for fear that they would give interviews to foreign media stations (Braithwaite 2011, 
235). Most Western reports of the war were based on secondhand or eyewitness accounts from 
refugees living in Pakistan (Thorne 1986, 26). Even though foreign media access to Afghanistan 
was already limited, the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan stated in 1984 that “so-called 
journalists” accompanying Afghan guerillas would be killed upon entering Afghanistan (Thorne 
1986, 26). 
 Soviet media strategies worked until Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’. Only then did the 
Soviet citizenry understand that their leaders were not completely honest about the way events 
were turning out in Afghanistan. The population openly condemned the corruption that had 
become prevalent. The people struggled with one of the largest problems of a command 
economy: money was plentiful but goods were not. In a survey of experts on the prevalence of 
corruption of the USSR, Vladimir Belyaminov addressed the relationship between the goods 
deficit and corruption: 
Today’s corruption is a silent system that lives parallel to us. There are whole segments 
of the economy (intermediaries, representatives, those who provide “information 
services”), which function and are not going to die out anytime soon. There are 
intermediaries between those who have access to the resource and those who want to 
obtain their [resources] “quicker” and “easier.” [Сергей Сибиряков 2010] 
 
 Young men in the USSR were obligated to serve two years in the Red Army, and very 
few wanted to spend their assignment serving in Afghanistan. Many parents donated large 
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amounts of money to government officials to ensure their sons would not fight in Afghanistan 
but would serve their country in a much less hostile area of the Soviet Union (Grau 2004, 148).  
 
The Casualties and the Home Front 
At the beginning of the Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviet Union grossly misrepresented the 
situation in Afghanistan, particularly the number of casualties among Soviet soldiers: “During 
the first two years of the conflict, the Soviet press covered the deaths of some two dozen 
servicemen—though thousands had already died” (Grau 2004, 148). Family members of those 
who perished in Afghanistan would receive the body for burial in the infamous zinc coffin on 
one condition—complete and utter secrecy. “Even the earlier tombstones did not list where the 
serviceman had died, only that he had died ‘fulfilling his internationalist duty’” (Grau 2004, 
148). At other times, family members would not receive a body. Instead, “they were presented 
with a form: ‘Your son perished while fulfilling his international duty in Afghanistan’” 
(Tamarov 2001, 3). Compounding the difficult situation of Soviet families, soldiers were 
instructed to limit their communications with their parents for security purposes. Many 
servicemen reported being told “not to complain about things because it will only make your 
parents worry” (Finger Lake Times 1984). Yet, parents were not completely unaware of their 
sons’ circumstances. One soldier recalled: 
I used to write my parents that I was serving somewhere abroad, that I was eating grapes, 
reading a lot, and watching TV. But in my parents’ first letter back to me, my father 
wrote that I shouldn’t think they were stupid, that they knew perfectly well where I was. 
When I came home two years later, I was shocked to see the change in my mother. She 
had gotten old. [Tamarov 2001, 138] 
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This constant state of ignorance and terror took its toll. The Soviet people began to resent the 
loss of their sons “fulfilling their international duty,” and the public’s attitude towards the war 
soured. 
 
RELIGION 
Religion was one of the more glaring disparities between the Russian soldiers and the 
Afghan Mujahedeen. For the communist Russians, religion was a sign of weakness, a coping 
mechanism for an archaic culture. But to the Mujahedeen, Islam was everything. It was their 
culture, their way of life, and their motivation for fighting. Within the Soviet military, there were 
often disagreements between Russian combatants and the ethnically Central Asian soldiers. 
These Central Asian soldiers were faced with adverse messages about religion. The Soviet 
attitude directly challenged their culture and heritage of Islam. For some soldiers, this 
contradiction influenced their decision to desert the Soviet army. 
 
Religion in the Soviet Union 
The founding leader of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Illyich Lenin, thought that religion 
justified tyrannical rule while distracting and appeasing those who were searching for freedom 
from the oppressive employer. In 1905, Lenin was actively distributing the Novaya Zhizn’, the 
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party’s first newspaper. During this period, Lenin wrote what 
would become an influential expose on religion stating:  
Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression which everywhere weighs down 
heavily upon the masses of the people, over burdened by their perpetual work for others, 
by want and isolation…Those who toil and live in want all their lives are taught by 
religion to be submissive and patient while here on earth, and to take comfort in the hope 
of a heavenly reward. But those who live by the labor of others are taught by religion to 
practice charity while on earth, thus offering them a very cheap way of justifying their 
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entire existence…Religion is opium for the people. Religion is a sort of spiritual booze, 
in which the slaves of capital drown their human image, their demand for a life more or 
less worthy of man. [Ленин 1905] 
 
To the Soviets who shared in Lenin’s sentiment, the religious commitment and devotion of the 
Mujahedeen was backward and archaic. The USSR’s dedication to Marxism prevented it from 
recognizing the validity of such religious obligation. This is not to say that the Soviet Union did 
not have experience with Islam. On the contrary, a large portion of its population was ethnically 
and religiously Muslim. Even though the regime’s official stance on religion was the “opiate to 
the masses” philosophy, historically Soviet Central Asians were overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims. 
The Communist Party, however, tried to discourage the religious practices of these Central Asian 
regions. During the 1930s, the Soviet Union led an attack on Islam and other Central Asian 
practices—such as polygamy, veiling women, and bride price—that were perceived as 
oppressive to women. In his book, Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia, 
Douglas Northrop writes that women’s emancipation in Uzbekistan came to “exemplify the 
entire Bolshevik revolution” (Northrop 2004, 9). This offensive, known in the local languages as 
hujum, led many Central Asians to immigrate to Afghanistan and forever set Soviets—at least in 
the eyes of the Afghans—in opposition to Islam. As late as the 1980s, the Soviet propaganda 
system struggled with the anti-religionist policy in Central Asia: 
Although the percentage of young believers is not large, the positions of religion are still 
strong and the process whereby it is reproduced in the new generation has not been 
stopped. Rural school teachers themselves admit that their atheistic work is not very 
effective. There are pupils who arrive in school with definite religious views that have 
evolved within the family. [Дадабаева 1981, 27]  
During the war in Afghanistan, Soviet attitudes towards Muslims continued to shift 
downward. Muslims were perceived as increasingly unstable, volatile populations that required 
caution and vigilance. The communist populace began to equate pious Muslims with Islamic 
extremism. For some Soviet Muslims, this bias and intolerance played a role in their decision to 
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desert the Red Army. These soldiers opted to fight with the Mujahedeen as religious brothers 
because their spiritual and cultural upbringing mirrored that of the freedom fighters.  
 
Religion in Afghanistan 
For the Afghan freedom fighters, Islam was deeply embedded in their lives and culture. 
The Soviets’ disdain for all religions generally, and Islam especially, only served to increase the 
Afghans’ suspicion and hesitancy to gratefully bask in the chilling glow of communism. While 
Islam is a complex and multifaceted religion, one aspect provided a particular motivation and 
justification for the Mujahedeen’s acts of war: jihad. Jihad is an important part of Islam and is 
sometimes referred to as the “sixth pillar of Islam.” The word jihad may be used to refer to any 
kind of conflict to preserve or bring to pass a good cause. Although it is often mistranslated into 
English as “holy war,” jihad generally refers to a much more benign case: the effort a Muslim 
makes to live and structure his or her society on Islamic principles (Hewer 2006, 17). For the 
everyday Muslim, jihad represents the internal struggle against evil or temptation. To Muslims in 
the Soviet Union, it often meant resisting temptation by refraining from drinking alcohol or 
avoiding fornication. It could also have been as simple as finding the time to pray five times a 
day. 
However, the word jihad also can be used to refer to holy war in a purely military sense. 
Most Muslims regard this definition as “lesser” jihad. In Islam, the use of violence and force is 
considered far too serious to be left to human initiative; it must be used according to the laws of 
God. From the Mujahedeen’s perspective, the Soviet Union had occupied Afghanistan and 
sparked a defensive jihad. Therefore, God sanctioned their war against the Red Army. Their 
struggle was real. It was every Muslim’s duty to wage war against the godless communists who 
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had come to Afghanistan to pervert the conservative, righteous lifestyles of Afghans with 
atheism and immorality. For the Mujahedeen, the concept of lesser jihad provided an impetus, a 
rallying cry to their fellow Muslims to resist the Soviet tyrants. It was an appeal to all Muslims to 
follow their example, to be stalwarts in the physical defense of an Islamic nation against atheist 
oppressors. In some ways, this rallying cry was a success. While the majority of the Afghan 
resistance movement were native Afghans fighting for their country’s independence and an 
Islamic government, many of the freedom fighters were from Arabian Gulf countries.  
The Mujahedeen’s emphasis on militaristic jihad inevitably led to the development of 
Islamic extremism in Afghanistan. Although many Muslims did not participate in Islamic 
radicalism during the war, various Mujahedeen began to be driven by the conviction that, 
through endless sacrifice and implacable determination, their jihad would eventually triumph. 
For the extremists, the blood and sacrifice of their martyrdom through jihad would eventually 
restore the purity of the faith (Wheatcroft 2005, 301). The withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 
1989 confirmed this belief. After nine years of war, the Mujahedeen were triumphant. They felt 
“their meeting with God’s appointed time is bound to come” (Haleem 2005, 29).  
My thesis is laid out in three major sections. Part I: Soviet Defectors discusses the 
environment and circumstances in which these men fought prior to their capture or defection. I 
examine Soviet military training in preparation for service in Afghanistan, conditions Red Army 
soldiers experienced while in Afghanistan, and Central Asians’ experience in the Soviet Army 
during this period. Part II: A New Life in a New Land addresses historical treatment of POWs at 
the hands of the Soviets and psychological factors that may have strongly influenced some of the 
POWs’ decisions to remain in Afghanistan following release from captivity. In Part III: Case 
Studies, I address POWs’ individual experiences prior to, during, and after their captivity.  
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PART I: THE SOVIET DEFECTORS 
 
 In any war, there are men who desert their posts and abandon patriotic responsibilities. 
Naturally, the Soviet-Afghan War was not devoid of these defectors. There were, however, a 
number of factors unique to the Soviet Army that contributed to the desertion rate. To begin 
with, many soldiers became disillusioned with the war. They were told that they would be 
defending their country and serving the Afghan population, but instead, they found themselves 
fighting against Afghan natives for unclear reasons. Following his service in Afghanistan, former 
soldier Vladislav Tamarov wrote: 
Now, our troops have returned from Afghanistan. Now, our government has announced 
that the war was a ‘mistake.’ Now, I think about the results of this mistake. Tens of 
thousands killed, hundreds of thousands of bodies crippled and fates twisted. That is the 
only result of this war. What can any war give, aside from such results? [Tamarov 2001, 
3] 
 
From the outset, the Soviet leadership had failed to define their mission in Afghanistan. 
During the Soviet occupation, the communist-backed Afghan Army had desertion problems of 
its own due to this reason. Reportedly, “every month, an average of 1,500 to 2,000 men desert… 
The main reasons for the desertions were the low level of political understanding of the soldiers 
and their complete lack of understanding of the goals and missions of armed conflict” (The 
Russian General Staff 2002, 51). In addition, much of the Red Army was ill-prepared and 
inadequately trained for a military offensive in Afghanistan. Many soldiers received insufficient 
military training before they were deployed, and Soviet cultural training about life in 
Afghanistan was inadequate.  
Upon arrival in Afghanistan, many Soviet fighters were horrified by the USSR’s 
violation of human rights agreements and the treatment of Afghan civilians. Soviet soldiers lived 
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and fought in poor conditions, and many suffered from medical maladies and drug abuse. 
Furthermore, the Red Army was not always welcoming to new troops. The ranks of the Soviet 
Army were permeated with a sort of “pecking order” that many young servicemen resented. 
Green recruits often found themselves victims of hazing and mistreatment by more experienced 
soldiers. Central Asian recruits were also subject to racial discrimination and abuse. As such, 
these soldiers, who were ethnically linked to the would-be enemy, often struggled to find the 
motivation to assault individuals whose culture and belief system mirrored their own. 
 
PREPARING FOR WAR 
The Disparity: Propaganda and Soviet Troops 
 Many of the Soviet soldiers who abandoned the Red Army did so because of the blatant 
discrepancy between Soviet propaganda and the actual situation in Afghanistan. The Soviet 
government grossly misrepresented the state of affairs at the warfront to both its citizens and its 
soldiers. As a result, many soldiers misunderstood the role they would be playing in the Soviet-
Afghan War and, once in Afghanistan, grew discontent. The constitution of the Soviet Union 
states that “[m]ilitary service to the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army is an honorable duty of 
the citizens of the USSR. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen” (USSR 
Constitution, art. 132-133). Accordingly, the Soviet populace was expected to respect and honor 
the troops serving in Afghanistan. Young men drafted into the army were taught that they would 
be serving their country by providing necessary assistance to the Afghan people. However, upon 
their arrival in Afghanistan, many troops were disturbed by the shocking disparity between 
Soviet propaganda and reality.  
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As soldiers were deployed to Afghanistan by the thousands, they were sent out with 
various misconceptions regarding the Soviet-Afghan War.  
Up until 1985, in the press and on television, they told us that Soviet soldiers in 
Afghanistan were planting trees and building schools and hospitals. Only a few knew 
that more and more cemeteries were being filled with the graves of eighteen- to twenty-
year-old boys. Without the dates of their death, without inscriptions. Only their names 
on black stone… [Mothers whose sons died] were presented with a form: “Your son 
perished while fulfilling his internationalist duty in Afghanistan.” [Tamarov 2001, 1-3] 
 
In 1988, the US Army commissioned a RAND corporation study headed by Alexander 
Alexiev to examine the strength and weaknesses of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. This study 
was based on extensive interviews with 35 former Soviet military personnel who had defected 
from the Soviet Army. One defecting soldier recounted, “I knew very little about Afghanistan. I 
just knew that Soviet soldiers there were assisting the Afghans to build kindergartens, schools, 
and houses. Once I got there I saw right away that this was a big lie, nothing but lies” (Alexiev 
1988, 19). Another soldier remembered viewing a propaganda film that showed Soviet troops 
playing with Afghan children and milking cows (Alexiev 1988, 18). Soviet soldiers and citizens 
were often told that the military was invited by the Afghan people who needed the Soviet 
Union’s help to defeat the invading Americans and Chinese. Some soldiers were unaware that 
they would be serving in Afghanistan until they were on the transport plane en route (Alexiev 
1988, 6). Contrarily, others reported being told, “Whoever wants to go to Afghanistan will go to 
Afghanistan and whoever doesn’t will go there anyway” (Thorne 1986, 14). 
 Upon realizing the extent of their government’s deception, the reaction among some 
servicemen was dissatisfaction and pessimism. As a former Soviet soldier put it, troops were 
‘‘humiliated by being used as tools’’ in the war (Prinz 1986). Soldiers were disappointed in their 
government’s lack of honesty and disregard for its citizens. The RAND corporation study for the 
US Army observed: 
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The general reaction to such heavy-handed and implausible propaganda is said to be 
widespread cynicism among the rank and file…A number of our respondents told us that 
the process of questioning the system, which eventually led them to defect, first began 
upon realization of the extent of official demagoguery in Afghanistan. [Alexiev 1988, 20] 
 
As more soldiers became dissatisfied with the misrepresentation of the Afghan War and 
conditions in which they lived, more defected to the Mujahedeen. Over the course of ten years, 
more than 100 Soviets defected to the Mujahedeen, with at least two dozen joining the resistance 
and actively fighting Soviet forces (Alexiev 1988, 61-2). Servicemen were not willing to die 
fighting for a cause they did not support and for which the circumstances of their death would be 
covered up.  
 
Military and Cultural Training 
Before deployment, Red Army soldiers underwent basic military and cultural training. 
This education was meant to provide military aptitude, rudimentary language skills (known as 
survival language skills), and general cultural knowledge (Бондарчук 2005). It was intended to 
equip trainees with the ability and expertise they would need to successfully function in a war 
environment. The cultural programs were intended to give the soldiers increased cultural 
sensitivity, which would hopefully allow them to conduct their missions with respect for the 
local traditions and enable them to handle culturally sensitive issues with tact. In reality, most 
Central Asian recruits did not even possess the language skills to effectively serve as combat 
troops in the Soviet Army. Before the war, one Russian study had observed, “Language 
preparation of students to serve in the Soviet Army is, at the present time, one of the gravest 
problems which confronts the national schools” (Абузиаров 1978. 4). However, the USSR was 
hard-pressed for fighters. As such, many servicemen did not receive sufficient military training, 
and the Soviet Army’s initial invading force was severely lacking in military preparation. The 
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little training these soldiers did receive was based on a more traditional form of ground warfare 
with the United States: 
When the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan, they not only had no practical skills in the 
conduct of counter guerrilla warfare, they also did not have a single well-developed 
theoretical manual, regulation, or tactical guideline for fighting such a war…There were 
no directives on training the force for this type of war; however, the necessity of such 
training was already evident during the first months after the 40th Army’s arrival in 
Afghanistan.” [Russian General Staff 2002, 43] 
 
Thus, soldiers were completely unprepared for the mountainous deserts of Afghanistan 
and the guerilla warfare tactics of the Mujahedeen. Later, the Soviet Union changed its training 
location to the more appropriate setting of Central Asia in areas such as Ashkhabad, Iolotan, 
Termez, Chardzou, and Tedzhen (Alexiev 1988, 14). These training camps gave soldiers a more 
accurate environment in which to train for combat. Nevertheless, these new surroundings did 
nothing to correct the shortened training time most soldiers received. One soldier recalled:  
I was supposed to have six months’ training in boot camp, but our officers were in a 
hurry – they knew we could be sent off earlier…For other kinds of troops, training was 
just a formality and lasted only a few weeks, except for the special troops, the landing 
storm troops. [Tamarov 2001, 14-19]   
 
This incomplete military training left many soldiers physically and psychologically unprepared 
for the hardships of war. As they struggled with combat, injuries, and casualties, some were 
unable to handle the difficulties and deserted. 
Although Soviet servicemen did undergo various forms of cultural training, oftentimes 
these classes took the form of political indoctrination. These classes for soldiers began even 
before the invasion of Afghanistan. They became a standard part of Army training after the 
Воениздат’s 1972 issue of ‘Recommendations for the Psychological Training of the Ground 
Forces (Дубовой 2004, 6). They were propaganda forums that impressed upon the soldiers their 
patriarchal relationship to Afghanistan and the helplessness of its people (Бондарчук 2005). 
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While various cultural aspects were discussed—like some very basic language skills—most of 
these lectures provided little useful knowledge. Some soldiers even reported using these classes 
as a time to catch up on sleep (Tamarov 2001, 12). The Russian General Staff’s own post-war 
reports on training in Afghanistan illustrated a general concern for the quality of training that had 
been received: “The training of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan was often an extension of the 
peacetime training regimen…The political training, the full-field inspections, and the repetitious 
drills often degraded, instead of improved, combat readiness” (Russian General Staff 2002, 48). 
 In his dissertation “Moral-Psychological Support of Soviet Soldiers in the Territory of 
Afghanistan,” Andrei Dubovoi provides a series of conditions in which this type of training can 
be effective. He states:  
Moral and psychological support of the troops should be specific, be focused on a 
specific opponent, on real and specific conditions of the fight, taking into account 
features of modern warfare, the tasks to which [the troops] will be assigned, and the 
means to be used. High morale of units can only be achieved through a combination of 
deep conviction, military skills and psychological training of soldiers. [Дубовой 2004, 
16] 
 
In the end, it seems that the USSR’s cultural training programs failed to fulfill the requirements 
Dubovoi thought to be successful. The US Army report stated, “Given the emphasis on political 
indoctrination in the Soviet army, psychological preparation and motivation of the troops for 
service in Afghanistan is surprisingly poor and possibly even counterproductive” (Alexiev 1988, 
vi and Бодаренко 2005). Without sufficient cultural training, many soldiers began to develop a 
sense of prejudice against Afghans as well as Muslims in general. Soldiers began to view Islam 
as a violent and extreme religion. 
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LIFE IN AFGHANISTAN 
The Soviet Army’s living situation in Afghanistan left much to be desired. The conditions 
of combat combined with the deserts of Afghanistan and extremely poor hygiene had a negative 
effect on the health and morale of the Soviet military. Soldiers were forced to live amid filth and 
squalor. One unnamed interviewee spoke of his experiences in Afghanistan, stating:  
Living conditions were terrible. Underwear was not issued, the bed sheets were never 
changed, and the soldiers rarely took a bath. And even if there was a possibility to bathe, 
you had to wash with water that was barely warm or cold. [Alexiev 1988, 46] 
 
In addition to poor living conditions, the soldiers’ diet also suffered. Most meals came from 
canned food and were generally bland and unsatisfying. As a result of these circumstances, the 
morale among the Soviet military further deteriorated. 
 
Soviet Medical Care 
Not only was the Soviet Union unprepared to provide proper hygienic care for its 
military, it also failed to offer sufficient medical attention. During a standard two-year 
deployment, it was expected that 60 percent of the force would succumb to either malaria or a 
water-borne illness such as amoebeosis, cholera, hepatitis, Shigellosis, or typhus (Grau 2004, 
140). The medical personnel were unequipped to treat the various diseases that soldiers 
developed, and some scholars have hypothesized that more soldiers succumbed to disease than 
died in combat (Alexiev 1988, 45). Many of the common ailments were hygiene-related like 
jaundice and dysentery from unclean water and unsanitized dinnerware. Other complaints 
stemmed from the strenuous nature of combat: 
One former sergeant recalled that cases of acute heat prostration [exhaustion] in his 
regiment were so numerous during operations that the medical unit was overwhelmed and 
unable to deal with all of them. According to him, nine soldiers died of heat stroke during 
his four months in the regiment. [Alexiev 1988, 47] 
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Combat injuries also posed a challenge because of the difficulty of evacuation from the 
mountains of Afghanistan. Units stationed in remote outposts received supplies on an unreliable 
basis. If soldiers were injured in these remote areas, it could be weeks before the wounded were 
evacuated.  
 
Drug Use 
 Soviet soldiers also complained of intense boredom and the subsequent drug abuse that 
often accompanied it. An extreme sense of monotony and isolation permeated the ranks of the 
Soviet Army. This frustration multiplied as soldiers were not allowed any home leave during 
their two-year service in Afghanistan, and Soviet censors prevented the servicemen from 
communicating any real information with their family members at home. Additionally, soldiers 
undoubtedly suffered from the psychological effects of warfare, including mental and emotional 
stress and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Discontent and unsatisfied, some soldiers 
searched in vain for the familiar outlet of their homeland: vodka. Unfortunately for lower-
enlisted soldiers, alcohol was a valuable commodity in the Soviet-Afghan War. It was generally 
not produced in Afghanistan, difficult to obtain for enlisted soldiers, and expensive to ship from 
Russia. Many soldiers became creative in their search for a substitute: 
You cannot imagine what they drink. They will drink shaving lotions and cologne. That’s 
good stuff. Then they will drink toothpaste…They will simply squeeze four or five tubes 
in a jar, dilute it with water and drink it. They also drank truck antifreeze, glue, and brake 
fluid…They will also take shoe polish and smear it on a piece of bread and leave it in the 
sun until the alcohol separates from the shoe polish. Then you eat the bread and get 
drunk. [Alexiev 1988, 52] 
 
Other soldiers used yeast, raisins, and bread to concoct their moonshine. Recalling the ever-
present search for alcohol, one ex-soldier remarked, “We needed it to raise our morale. Without 
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it we had no morale” (Tempest 1984). For these combatants, alcohol provided a much-needed 
release from the hostility and monotony of warfare. However, the shortage of alcohol led some 
soldiers to turn in desperation to another, much more available form of intoxication. 
Without sufficient medical care or psychological training, many Soviet servicemen were 
unequipped to cope with the ennui and pressure associated with war. As this phenomenon grew, 
some soldiers turned to drug use as a means of coping with their dissatisfaction. The most 
common drugs were hashish, opium, and marijuana. Soldiers also experimented with heroin, a 
heroin-like substance called koknar, and cheffir (an extremely concentrated form of tea). Hashish 
was an especially popular choice, and the majority of soldiers admitted using it at least once. One 
former POW recalled, “I didn’t have a single friend who was not using hashish” (Prinz 1986). 
Much like the alcohol abuse, servicemen reported using drugs to deal with boredom and cope 
with stress. One defector-serviceman explained after his arrival in the United States, “Most 
soldiers smoke hashish and opium because they are bored. There is nothing to do over there, 
nothing to entertain yourself with… it’s just torture, nothing else” (Alexiev 1988, 50). Another 
soldier admitted, “With this kind of life you’ll not only turn into an addict, but you’ll be ready to 
do anything, cut your wrists, your legs, or your throat” (Thorne 1986, 13).  
This drug abuse undoubtedly influenced the performance of the Soviet military. For some 
deserters, the rampant drug and alcohol use encouraged their disillusionment with the Soviet 
Union. Additionally, the use of drugs in the army sparked illegal trading between servicemen and 
Afghans, which increased village raids as soldiers searched for drugs. One ex-Soviet soldier 
remembered, “The Afghans would exchange it [hashish] for all kinds of stuff. Once two guys 
swapped hashish for bullets; one was sentenced to nine years in prison, the other to six years” 
(Rybakov 1983). As the search for drugs brought Soviet servicemen into contact with Afghan 
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civilians, some soldiers recognized the damage the war was causing among the civilian 
population and became disenchanted with the Afghan War. 
 
Personnel Relations 
Наша армия—особая армия и в том смысле, что она есть школа 
интернационализма, школа воспитания чувств братства, солидарности и 
взаимного уважения всех наций и народностей Советского Союза. Наши 
Вооруженные Силы—единая дружная семья, живое воплощение 
социалистического интернационализма. [Л.И. Брежнев 1978, 556] 
 
Our army is a special army in the sense that it is a school of internationalism, a 
school that fosters feelings of brotherhood, solidarity, and mutual respect among 
all nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union. Our Armed Forces are a united, 
close-knit family, the living embodiment of socialist internationalism.1 
[L.I. Brezhnev 1978, 556] 
 
The Soviet Army had a long history of abuse between first and second-year soldiers 
known as dedovshchina or starikovshchina2.  Basically, this system involves a sort of structured 
hazing of more recent recruits by the experienced soldiers. The soldiers that have been in combat 
longer, called the stariki, are permitted to debase and harass the more green combatants, the 
                                                          
1 I included Brezhnev’s quote for a sense of irony concerning brotherhood within the ranks of the Soviet military. 
From a purely-military perspective, Army service did encourage learning a common language but lacked socially to 
build mutual respect and cohesion among the Socialist peoples’. 
2 This tradition has carried over into the contemporary Russian army. In 2006, the New York Times reported that at 
least 16 Russian soldiers were murdered whilst undergoing dedovshchina and an additional 272 committed suicide 
as a result of the hazing. There had been 3500 reports of abuse up until August that year (Myers 2006 and Prodan 
2013) 
21 
 
molodiye. In Afghanistan, newer recruits were routinely stripped of their possessions, including 
cigarettes, lighters, coats, boots, pants, gloves, etc. They were also subjected to other forms of 
victimization, such as scrubbing out latrines with toothbrushes, being forced beneath beds, and 
running with gas masks on until they fainted (Alexiev 1988, 36). The young molodiye were also 
responsible for many of the stariki’s chores and guard duties. Any refusal to comply with these 
demands was met with severe and violent beatings. There were many reports of soldiers being 
hospitalized as a result of abuse from the stariki during the Soviet-Afghan War. One former 
soldier recalled: 
In Afghanistan everyone gets demoralized almost at once. [The stariki] just kept saying, 
“We were given a hard time, now it’s our turn to make you suffer.”  They would always 
try to hit us where it hurt the most. Mostly it was the career sergeants, who had already 
served some years. [Rybakov 1983] 
 
As can be imagined, these antagonistic relations between soldiers had a detrimental effect upon 
morale in the Soviet Army. While these acts of persecution were not officially endorsed, they 
were not discouraged either. The same soldier reported that “the officers try to keep out of it 
[because] they depend on the elders [stariki] and the sergeants” (Rybakov 1983). Senior officers 
turned a blind eye, and the act of reporting cruelty only brought more severe retribution.  
This systematic abuse served to undermine the military administration. Often, the stariki 
held seniority over new arrivals regardless of rank. Thus, a commanding officer recently 
stationed to a new area could be subject to maltreatment. Additionally, this systematic 
exploitation sometimes led new recruits to take drastic action. Some soldiers committed suicide, 
while others turned upon their oppressors, beating them3 and, in more severe cases, actively 
aided the enemy4. The more crafty recruits would make these attacks look like accidents or acts 
                                                          
3 See the accounts of Beg (43) and Plotnikov (66). 
4 See accounts of Levenets (57), Naumov (61) and (Alexiev 1988, 62). 
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of war. As one deserter observed, “You can’t tell from the bullets how they were killed because 
the Mujahedeen use the same weapons as the Soviets5” (Thorne 1986, 23). In one instance of 
abuse, an entire unit of paratroopers turned against their tormenter: “As they were scrambling 
along a narrow ridge, one of the paratroopers hit the politruk [political instructor] in the face, so 
that he fell over the edge and was killed” (Thorne 1986, 23). Less cunning soldiers were 
convicted of attempted murder and sent to Soviet prisons (Rybakov 1983). Still other soldiers 
deserted the Red Army to escape the abuse. 
 
CENTRAL ASIANS IN THE SOVIET ARMY 
 
An important circumstance which helps to deepen a feeling of friendship among peoples 
is the fact that the Soviet military, as a rule, serve outside their republic, krai or oblast’. 
Daily contact with the fraternal peoples and familiarity with their culture, everyday life, 
rites, and traditions help to strengthen ties of friendship between them. The struggle 
against negative phenomena, obsolete traditions and rites also helps international 
indoctrination. It would be an oversimplification to reduce these merely to vestiges of the 
past. Even under conditions when there are no objective prerequisites for national 
antagonism, among certain people, if they are not constantly indoctrinated, nationalistic 
distortions are still not excluded. [Скрыльник 1981, 11] 
 
Within the Soviet Army, there was an ironic illogic that tested the loyalties of many of 
the Soviet servicemen of Central Asian descent. The Soviet Central Asian republics are 
geographically and historically tied to the people of Afghanistan. At the time of the Soviet 
invasion, three major Afghan ethnic groups (Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen) had about 18 million 
co-nationals living in the USSR. Soviet Central Asians stationed in Afghanistan were inevitably 
drawn to the ethnic and cultural ties they found among the Afghan people. One Soviet KGB 
                                                          
5 By the end of the war, there were 2,840 cases in which Soviet soldiers were incarcerated for selling weapons to the 
Afghans (Braithwaite 2011, 227). 
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Major remembered that Central Asians “showed little interest in fighting their neighbors…in no 
time at all they were black-marketeering (including selling army equipment), buying Korans and 
robbing the local population” (Zhou 2012, 321). Many of these soldiers chose to remain in 
Afghanistan because of the connection they felt with the local population and the mistreatment 
they had received at the hands of the Soviets. Although many Central Asians were committed to 
communism and the cause of the Soviet Union, they deserted in higher numbers than their 
Russian counterparts (Alexiev 1988, 44).  
The Soviet system claimed to be a political structure in which all were equally respected 
and rewarded. Slogans such as “brotherly peoples,” bratskiye narodi, peppered Soviet 
propaganda and the national anthem. Nevertheless, this ideal was rarely a reality. The misguided 
belief that Central Asians were incapable soldiers, their lack of Russian language skills, their 
prevalence in the enlisted ranks and general exclusion from the officer corps, and the rampant 
racism found in the Red Army contributed to the mistreatment of Central Asians in the armed 
forces. Racial hierarchy was always present in the army, as was the military rank, structure, and 
veteran hierarchy. “During the mid- and late 1970’s, some 70-75% of the Soviet officers were 
Russians-Byelorussians. Practically all the non-Slavic officers were captains and below” 
(Bodansky 1982, 188). Officially, discrimination of this sort did not exist. In 1981, Colonel 
Bel’kov (Бельков) wrote in the Communist military magazine, Коммунист Вооруженных Сил:  
One of the important manifestations of such equality is the multinational composition of 
the Soviet officer corps. In a socialist society, a man of any nationality can dedicate 
himself to professional military service. Moreover, during the period of creating the bases 
of socialism, when actual inequality of peoples still survived, the CPSU carried out 
special measures to train national military cadres and set aside the necessary number of 
places in military schools for all republics. Under the leadership of the Communist Party 
the multinational officer cadres have grown up and became stronger. At present, 
multinationality remains a qualitative feature of the Soviet officer corps. It is manned by 
the best representatives of all the Soviet nations and nationalities. [Бельков 1981] 
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The Numbers 
At the onset of the Soviet-Afghan War, there was a surplus of Central Asians serving in 
the invading forces. One individual noted that “three-fourths of the soldiers who served with him 
in a motorized rifle regiment at Kushka, Turkmenia, on the border with Afghanistan, were 
Central Asians” (Alexiev 1988, 5). There are several reasons for this over-representation. The 
most obvious explanation was the propinquity of units based in the Central Asian republics to the 
war front. They were simply closer to the area of conflict and were conveniently located for an 
early Soviet advancement:  
In mid-September of 1979, months before the actual invasion, Soviet reserves in the 
Turkestan and Central Asian military districts (headquartered in Chirchik, Uzbekistan 
and Kapchugay, Kazakhstan, respectively) were mobilized… Westerners reported that 
the initial deployment included anywhere from as few as 30 and as high as 90 percent 
Central Asian soldiers. [Zhou 2012, 316] 
 
These early units were able to reach Afghanistan much faster than other more centralized Soviet 
troops. Unfortunately, the majority of these early troops were very poorly trained, and casualties 
were high. 
 An alternative theory suggests that the deployment of Central Asians may have been a 
strategic maneuver on the part of the Soviet Union. Linguistically and culturally, these Central 
Asians were certainly better equipped to communicate with and relate to the Afghan population. 
According to this theory, the Soviet Union hoped that this rapport would enable the army to 
affect a smooth transition into Soviet rule. In addition, Soviet strategists may have hoped that 
these troops would set an example to the Afghan people, proving that communism and Islam 
were not mutually exclusive. They intended the Soviet Central Asians to serve “as 
representatives of socialism, to showcase the benefits and the success of socialist development to 
their fellow Muslims, and to disprove the idea that Islam and communism were incompatible” 
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(Zhou 2012, 315). These ideas, however, proved ineffective as the presence of Central Asians 
did not seem to appease the Afghan population. 
 As the war progressed, the number of Central Asians deployed to Afghanistan decreased. 
This is partly because they were simply rotated out: the Central Asian units were the first to enter 
Afghanistan, so they were also the first to leave. However, some have suggested that the removal 
of Central Asian troops was a deliberate move by the USSR (Zhou 2012, 322). Soviet strategists 
realized that the presence of these soldiers had little or no effect on the local population. 
Additionally, there were a number of demonstrations in the Soviet Union as Central Asian family 
members protested the higher death rate among their loved ones. “The peoples of Central Asia 
suffered proportionately the most—65 killed for every one million of the population—the story 
that Central Asians were unwilling to fight their co-religionists in Afghanistan is a myth.” 
(Braithwaite 2011, 329). Moreover, of the case studies found, only 2 of 21 soldiers who defected 
were of Central Asian descent. These Soviet Muslims found themselves surrounded by a people 
and culture remarkably similar to those of their homeland. This, juxtaposed with the rampant 
prejudice in the Soviet Army, created an environment that many Central Asians found 
distasteful. 
 
A Caution 
It is important to note a distinction between Soviet Central Asians and Caucasians, or 
people from the Caucasus Mountain region. Russians and other light-skinned ethnic groups, such 
as Ukrainians and Belarusians, reclined on top of the Soviet’s industrial totem pole, while 
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Central Asians labored at the bottom (Newton 2006 and Newton 2013)6. Caucasians, on the other 
hand, were largely exempt from this class structure. There are numerous accounts of Chechens 
and Dagestanis refusing to take orders from stariki and getting away with it, according to my 
interactions with both Russians and Central Asians who formerly served in the Red Army. One 
Tajik went even further to tell me the following anecdote: from childhood, Caucasians are 
trained in wrestling and fighting techniques and are taught to use them to protect their honor. 
Although these individuals were also Muslim, the Russians were apprehensive to order them 
about. Within Caucasian culture, pride, and honor are highly revered. If a Caucasian feels they 
have been disrespected, they are likely to respond violently and effectively (Newton 2013). For 
this reason, Russians generally steered away from abusing these Muslims and opted to batter 
their more passive Central Asian coreligionists.  
 
Military Performance and Language Skills 
Many Soviet officers had the mistaken idea that Muslims were inferior soldiers. This idea 
stems largely from the performance of the first Central Asian units deployed to Afghanistan. 
These early units were Central Asian reserve units that were severely lacking in competent 
military training: 
Whether for reasons of expediency or surprise, or because it underestimated the potential 
resistance, the Soviet military leadership fleshed out understrength units with local 
reservists in areas of the Turkestan Military District adjacent to Afghanistan, rather than 
deploying combat-ready units for the initial thrust. As a result, the majority of the 
[invading] Soviet forces were made up of Muslim Central Asian reservists. [Alexiev 
1988, 5] 
 
                                                          
6 In order to protect the identity of these individuals, I refer to the interviewees in aggregate as “Russians” or 
“Tajiks” 
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Their poor performance and high mortality rate led many to believe that Central Asians were 
incapable of competent military action. This supposed inability was apparently recognized by the 
Soviet government, as the number of Central Asians serving in the Red Army in Afghanistan 
sharply decreased after the initial invasion of Afghanistan.  
Even though the Soviet educational system claimed to have virtually eradicated illiteracy 
in Central Asia, literacy did not entail attaining Russian language skills as might be assumed. 
Many Central Asians had poor Russian language skills and were unable to communicate 
effectively. While a Russian language education system may have been more successful in 
urbanized areas, it lacked substantial roots in rural ones because of a shortage of trained teachers. 
Often local languages were the primary language of education in rural areas. Publicly, Soviet 
military leadership embraced these linguistic differences:   
In any family, however, not all brothers and sisters speak the same language. And we 
regarded it as something natural, because it could not be otherwise! We no longer even 
wonder why the differences among nationalities, which in any bourgeois army invariably 
result in mutual strife, alienation, and even open hostility, are relegated to a second plane 
in our Soviet Armed Forces, where precedence is given to the feeling of military duty and 
the awareness of personal and collective responsibility for the security of the great Soviet 
Homeland. Awareness is the same for all: Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, 
Belarusians, Georgians, Latvians, and Tadzhiks—all sons of one mother, the socialist 
homeland. [Долгов 1982] 
The majority of Central Asian recruits were not the educated elite of the few urban 
centers, but rather were from the outlying villages and countryside. “As practice has shown, 
young soldiers who have mastered Russian more quickly learn modern weapons and complex 
equipment and become class specialists. In the units’ service, comrades help those who have a 
poor knowledge of Russian” (Скрыльник 1981, 11). Unfortunately, many of these soldiers were 
relegated to manual labor and received no linguistic assistance. 
According to one of our respondents, one-third of the Central Asians in his regiment who 
participated in the invasion either did not understand or pretended not to understand even 
basic Russian. Many spoke no Russian at all…[an] article in Izvestiya, for example, 
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revealed that in Uzbekistan, “many recruits don’t speak Russian well enough to serve 
anywhere but in manual-labor battalions that dig ditches or pave roads.” [Alexiev 1988, 
11] 
 
Although some Central Asians were fluent in Russian and served in valuable military roles, the 
subordinate majority of these soldiers felt the compounded racism already present in the Soviet 
Army. Despite the apparent need for additional language instruction, the Soviet Union never did 
provide adequate linguistic training for these soldiers. In fact, several studies show that Russian 
proficiency among Central Asian soldiers actually decreased during the duration of the war 
(Alexiev 1988, 41). This is likely due to the fact that Central Asian soldiers who were less 
proficient in Russian were more likely to serve in undesirable assignments.  
  
Racism Becomes Abuse  
 The preexisting racial tensions in the Soviet Army multiplied during the strenuous 
conflict against the Muslim adversary. Central Asian soldiers were commonly referred to as 
chernozhopy (black asses) or churkas (a derogative term denoting stupidity) and assigned the 
more tedious and disagreeable tasks. One Ukrainian soldier reported: 
From the beginning we, the white people, considered ourselves somewhat higher and 
with more privilege than the churkas…that is why, when it is necessary to do some 
unpleasant work, say clean a toilet, a Kazakh would be sent and the Russians would make 
him do it…It has always been this way in the army. If I worked with a screwdriver, the 
Central Asian works with a shovel. [Zhou 2012, 318] 
 
Central Asian soldiers were often considered inferior and were not given the same considerations 
other soldiers were. Slavic troops were instructed to disregard their Central Asian comrades 
because they were untrustworthy and incompetent. One soldier was told not to trust Central 
Asians because they had “such an affinity for the local people” (Lapychak 1984). His officers 
explained that these Central Asians would no longer be assigned to serve in Afghanistan because 
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they too often interfered with Soviet campaigns or deserted to the Mujahedeen. “Graduates of the 
national schools are unable for a long time to be given responsible tasks in the army, and when 
possible they are assigned to the service divisions.” (Абузиаров 1978, 4) These Central Asians 
were condemned to labor units and were refused the privileges many ethnically Russian soldiers 
received. Central Asians were also at a higher risk of abuse by stariki. This extreme 
maltreatment contributed to instances of desertion and even suicide. One soldier recalled: 
I knew a young Uzbek who killed himself. He came to Afghanistan and soon ran away. 
The whole regiment looked for him for two days but couldn’t find him. Finally they 
found him in his native town. He was sent to the disbat for 20 days, and then they 
brought him back to the unit. After that, he was beaten severely every night by the stariki. 
His money was taken from him and they beat him even with a metal bar. He wrote a 
letter to his father telling him that he would rather die than serve any longer and begging 
him to come and take him home. Then one night at 2 a.m. he took a knife, went to the 
toilet, locked the door, and committed suicide. [Alexiev 1988, 37] 
 
This environment undoubtedly impacted the Central Asian soldiers, causing some to 
question the validity of the Soviet principles. In some cases, it appears the ethnic ties Central 
Asians found in Northern Afghanistan affected their military performance:  
An Afghan soldier of Uzbek ethnic origin, who defected to Pakistan in 1981…said that 
while serving in Kandahar airport he had become friendly with a Soviet Uzbek soldier 
with whom he could converse in the Uzbek tongue. The Soviet soldier…confided that 
when he and other Central Asians engaged in fire fights with [M]ujahidin7, they 
deliberately aimed their rifles inaccurately. [Zhou 2012, 320] 
 
The familiarity Soviet Central Asians experienced undoubtedly encouraged some soldiers to 
leave the Soviet Army for a more recognizable life. Although a few reported no racial 
mistreatment, most experienced at least some form of abuse.  
 
 
                                                          
7 Alternate spelling of Mujahedeen, as cited in Zhou’s quote. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN 
History teaches that the outcome of battles and war is often decided by the morale of the 
people, their psychological stability and willingness to bear hardships and sacrifices to 
achieve the objectives of the war. That is why the problem of strengthening the morale of 
the troops was always very relevant. [Дубовой 2004, 3] 
 The Soviet Union’s mistreatment of the Afghan population fostered a sense of bitterness 
among its soldiers, some of whom objected to the military’s complete disregard for civilians. 
During its campaign in Afghanistan, the USSR was reprimanded by several different Western 
commissions for its blatant disregard for human rights. Accusers cited the violation of multiple 
international treaties and coalitions, including the United Nations Charter; the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and the Final Act (US House 1985, 
8). Specifically, Western officials referenced acts of genocide, mass and summary executions, 
torture of prisoners, destruction of whole villages, destruction of agriculture and animals, and the 
use of chemical weapons. The Soviet military used these tactics to squash the Afghan rebellion 
and to attempt to curtail the influence of the Mujahedeen by beating the civilian population into 
submission. Many of the troops involved in these maneuvers found the exploitation and brutality 
distasteful. As one soldier observed, “We were struck by our own cruelty in Afghanistan. We 
executed innocent peasants. If one of ours was killed or wounded, we would kill women, 
children, and old people as a revenge. We killed everything, even the animals” (Alexiev 1988, 
58). Many Soviet deserters reflected on these events with horror and stated that this cruelty was a 
large part of their reasons for escaping the Soviet Union.  
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Acts of Torture and Acts of War 
 Prisoners of the Soviet military were often subjected to severe mistreatment and even 
torture at the hands of their adversaries. Soviet torture methods included beatings, pulling out 
hair or beards, pulling out nails, dried shaving of hair or beards, pouring boiling water on 
detainees, grinding pepper into eyes, electric shocks, sleep deprivation, forcing detainees to stand 
on ice or in the hot sun, toxic injection, and the torture of relatives or children (US National 
Committee for Human Rights in Afghanistan 1985, 4). While this mistreatment was indeed 
horrible, many Afghan prisoners did not even make it to the military prisons. Often, Soviet 
military officials would simply execute captured Afghans on the spot. A former member of the 
Afghan military remembered a time when “the [Soviet] troops caught 15 civilians and tightened 
[tied] them together and shot them at once on the spot” (US National Committee for Human 
Rights in Afghanistan 1985, 1). In another instance, “the troops caught 10 villagers, tightened 
[tied] them up, poured some oil on them, shot them and burned them at once” (US National 
Committee for Human Rights in Afghanistan 1985, 2). Oftentimes, these individuals were 
civilians with no relationship to the Mujahedeen.  
 The Soviet military also targeted entire villages. Sometimes these attacks were carried 
out by swift and impersonal bombing raids by the Soviet Air Force. One ex-Soviet soldier 
remembered a time when troops had some difficulty taking a village, so they called in air support 
“and they just bombed that village clean down to the ground” (Sciolino 1984). But more often, 
these attacks were the acts of isolated ground troops. While the official Soviet stance was that its 
military was liberating the Afghan people, troops were ordered by their superiors to annihilate 
entire villages. Often, these orders came as a form of revenge for Soviet casualties and hardships. 
For instance, one soldier recalled: 
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I was on a military mission for eighteen days. I had to go hungry and to carry corpses. 
You know, so many soldiers in our company died that it was horrible. They shot my best 
friend, so afterwards we went through the houses and shot all the residents one after the 
other: women, children, everybody. [Alexiev 1988, 58] 
 
Certainly, there were instances when Mujahedeen or insurgents were hiding in these villages, but 
frequently troops closed in on areas that clearly had no combatants hiding there. Often, these 
villages were bereft of all except women, children, and the elderly:  
Once they entered a village where only old men and women with children were left, 
because whenever we went on a search-and-destroy mission all the able-bodied men had 
left the villages. The lieutenant ordered his platoon to herd all these women, children, and 
old men together into one room and throw in hand grenades. [Alexiev 1988, 58] 
 
The Soviet military also abused local villages by destroying crops, irrigation systems, and 
livestock. These tactics were used as a form of retribution in an attempt to uproot the local 
population and force them to emigrate. There were also reports of military personnel using 
chemical weapons on the civilian population. One soldier recalled: 
The soldiers talked about the smell of poison gas at the airports. One Paratrooper told me 
about an engagement where they used gas. He said that the gas masks were poorly made, 
a lot of guys had their eyes hurt by the gas. When I was in a hospital for a few days I saw 
soldiers who had gone blind from the gas and whose skin had turned black from chemical 
weapons. [Rybakov 1983] 
 
Through these methods, the Soviet Army left a path of destruction in its wake as it 
annihilated entire communities. There were reports of villages leveled, their occupants killed or 
taken prisoner; devastated agriculture; and cultural tributes dishonored. An Afghan whose village 
was destroyed recollected: 
They entered the village with 60 tanks. They poured gasoline on the houses and burned 
them; they shot down the cattle with machine-guns; they killed the chickens; they even 
slaughtered the dogs. The Russians burned our mosque and trampled upon the Koran. I 
myself buried the dead with the help of people from the other two villages. Sometimes 
only halves of bodies were left. And sometimes only heads, cut off. We buried twenty 
women with bullets in their heads. [Alexiev 1988, 58] 
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As more reports of inhumane war tactics reached the West through Soviet defectors, media 
organizations began campaigning for some form of intervention on behalf of Afghanistan. These 
acts of terror provoked an outcry in the West, and many nations officially objected over these 
human rights violations. As one official put it, “The Soviets are not seeking simply the 
capitulation of the resistance forces or an end to the opposition. They are engaged in the 
wholesale slaughter of a people and the total destruction of a culture” (US House 1985, 17).  
 
Abandoning the Bloodshed 
Siding with the West, many Soviet soldiers also opposed the army’s harsh tactics and 
defected to avoid further participation. As a result of the disjuncture between the USSR’s 
misleading propaganda and the situation they found on the ground, the majority of Soviet troops 
already questioned the validity of their presence in a foreign country. When they witnessed the 
horrific treatment of civilians, they doubted their regime even further. Almost every POW I 
researched referenced the mistreatment of the civilian population as a factor in his desertion8. 
These were generally very young men, unaccustomed to so much graphic bloodshed and 
violence. Some soldiers felt that the Soviet Union’s positive propaganda was a cowardly attempt 
to hide what it was really doing in Afghanistan from the world. As one soldier said, “We would 
like the world to know more about Afghanistan and about the bayonets and silencers that were 
attached to our automatic rifles” (Thorne 1986, 11). To most defectors, the Soviet Union’s use of 
extreme military tactics was unacceptable and went against their deepest convictions. While 
some embraced these violent scenarios, others, such as Sergei Krasnoperov and Igor Kovalchuk, 
                                                          
8 A common misconception among Soviet leadership was that Central Asians were inferior soldiers. It is evident that 
inhumane acts played a more important role in defection rather than race. Of the POWs whose stories I document, 
19 were of Slavic origin and 2 were of Central Asian descent. 
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turned from them in horror and, unable to cope, abandoned the motherland they never dreamed 
could act so maliciously. There were soldiers who sought solace in joining the society their 
leaders encouraged them to destroy. 
 
PART II: A NEW LIFE IN A NEW LAND 
“It should always be borne in mind that in the formula ‘man-machine’, man 
always was, is, and always will be the more important element. Marxism-
Leninism tells us that the more the means of armed combat are perfected, the 
more important the role of man becomes.” [Меримский 1976, 3] 
 
Following their desertion, there were some Soviet defectors who opted to remain in 
Afghanistan even when faced with opportunities to return to the Soviet Union or seek asylum in 
the West. The majority of these soldiers converted to Islam and did their best to assimilate into 
their new culture. They usually married Afghan women, found jobs supporting their local 
community and often converted to Islam. Some of these ex-Soviets even performed the ultimate 
act of betrayal and took up arms against the Soviet Union. Their reasons for doing so are closely 
tied to their motivations for deserting the Soviet Army, yet there are also a number of unique 
factors that may have prevented some soldiers from leaving the land of their confinement. To 
begin with, ex-prisoners of war had historically been treated with contempt in the Soviet Union. 
They were usually tried, convicted of treason, and sent to the infamous gulags. Many Soviet 
deserters were simply too afraid to return home, worried of what awaited them there. Instead, 
they made efforts to make a new life for themselves in Afghanistan. Other ex-combatants 
expressed a deeper commitment to their newfound faith and culture. While there are likely many 
factors involved in their decision to convert to Islam and remain in Afghanistan it is probable 
these victims of psychological trauma were attempting to assuage their trauma and correct the 
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atrocities they participated in by pledging themselves to the Mujahedeen cause.  
 
HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF POWS 
 
As Soviet soldiers were captured in the Soviet-Afghan War, many were convinced that 
they could never return home because they feared retribution from the Soviet government. POWs 
held in Afghanistan would have been faced with the prospect of returning to their nation in 
shame or trying to find a new home. They likely knew they would be portrayed as traitors and 
cowards to their friends and family members at home. One Soviet POW who was exchanged for 
a Mujahedin9 prisoner was “sentenced to six years’ hard labor” (Braithwaite 2011, 259). 
Deserters would have remembered the countless World War II POWs that were deemed traitors 
and sentenced to years in the prison camps. This dread of humiliation—and possibly even 
prosecution—undoubtedly influenced Soviet fighters who opted to remain in Afghanistan after 
the close of the war. 
 
World War II 
World War II was the deadliest war the world had ever experienced. Within the USSR 
alone, estimates range between 20 and 50 million people dead10. Following the war, many 
individuals perceived as sympathetic to the German invaders were poorly treated, deported, and 
                                                          
9 Alternate spelling of Mujahedeen, as cited in Braithwaite’s quote.  
10 During the conflict, the Soviet Army’s front lines were “supported” by the infamous barrier troops. Soviet barrier 
troops should not be confused with conventional support or reinforcement units. Rather, the primary responsibility 
of barrier units was to prevent unauthorized retreat. They were to thwart chaos and panic in frontline conscript units 
by “blocking” their retreat, with deadly force if necessary. Red Army soldiers were not given the authorization to 
retreat under any circumstances. As such, soldiers who opted to retreat during battles were met by machine gun fire 
from the barrier troops. Thus the Soviet Army was actually responsible for a large portion of its own casualties.  
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in some instances killed. Prisoners of war of all ethnicities were targeted for government 
reprisals. 
On August 8, 1941, Stalin issued what became known as Order No. 270. In this order, 
those who surrendered to German forces were deemed traitors to the Soviet Union. Later on, this 
order was expanded to classify all of the Soviet citizens behind enemy lines as enemies of the 
state. Stalin’s paranoia was not entirely baseless, as many Soviet POWs did in fact fight for the 
Nazi Party:  
This notion [That POWs are traitors] had spread through the Red Army, in part because 
one million captive Soviet soldiers fought against their own country, some out of 
conviction, many out of desperation to survive the horrors of German captivity. By 1945, 
one out of eight soldiers in German uniform was a Soviet citizen. [Overy 1997, 361] 
 
Soviet Attitude towards POWs 
Given the chance to surrender to Soviet or Allied forces, German soldiers in WWII 
would flock to the Allied front lines because they knew they would receive better treatment 
(Ferguson 2004, 189). There were several reasons for this. First, Soviet forces tended to mistreat 
these prisoners because they did not respect POWs. They regarded prisoners of war as men 
without honor who had betrayed their country by surrendering. Second, the Germans betrayed 
the Non-aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, and Nazi forces knew that they 
could expect retribution at the hands of the Soviets. Contrarily, the American government was a 
signatory to the Geneva Convention. German forces knew the Americans respected and cared for 
the POWs under their care, and they feared Soviet vengeance for Nazi mistreatment of Slavic 
populations. Afraid of Soviet reprisals and the historical treatment of Soviet POWs, Germans 
sought to surrender to American military forces. 
Following the Second World War, the Soviet Union extended its distaste for prisoners of 
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war to include allied American and British POWs. These soldiers were held by Soviet forces for 
a short period of time following WWII. An American Lt. Colonel named James Wilmeth, who 
ensured the repatriation of Allied POWs, said the following regarding the Soviet military: 
The Soviet attitude toward liberated American prisoners is the same as the Soviet attitude 
toward the countries they have liberated. Prisoners are spoils of war won by Soviet arms. 
They may be robbed, starved, and abused—and no one has the right to question such 
treatment. [Wilmeth 1945, box 22, entry 319] 
 
The Soviet attitude towards POWs continued after WWII through the Afghan-Soviet War. Soviet 
POWs were perceived as traitors or spies.11 According to this mindset, those captured had 
willingly given up fighting for their motherland in exchange for the preservation of their lives.  
 
POWs in Afghanistan 
Soviet soldiers deployed to Afghanistan were well aware of the fate that befell retreating 
soldiers and POWs during World War II. They knew that, if they were captured, they would be 
victims of humiliation and degradation upon their return. At worst, they would be prosecuted and 
convicted of crimes against the motherland. Such a fate could not have appeared promising. As 
one ex-soldier observed, “If I am returned home they’ll put me in prison for a couple of years, 
maybe longer…What’s the point of going back to the Soviet Union?” (Rybakov 1983).  
Prisoners of war also knew that their family members and friends were likely informed of 
their disloyalty and encouraged to forget and reject their sons. As soldiers were captured or 
declared missing in action, their families were forced to face the difficulties of their loss. Some 
of these POWs were married not long before their deployment to Afghanistan. Often, word of 
                                                          
11 This attitude is difficult for Western minds to understand. Prisoners of war are honored in the West; the black 
POW/MIA banner promises, “You are not forgotten” and the Warrior Ethos states, “I will never leave a fallen 
comrade.” The US government makes every effort, both diplomatically and militarily, to recover its missing and 
captured personnel. America rejoices when its POWs return home. 
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their fate reached their loved ones, accompanied by accounts of the POW’s treasonous acts. 
Granted, there are some documented instances in which Red Army deserters joined forces with 
the Mujahedeen to fight their compatriots, but these instances were rare. In most cases, the POW 
was innocent of such rash accusations of treason. Prisoners of war suffered in solitude while their 
loved ones were tortured with the thought of their disloyalty.   
In later years, the Soviet Union attempted to make amends for the mistreatment of its 
own captured soldiers. It dropped treason convictions of several ex-prisoners of war and 
promised a safe and welcome return for any who wished it. One official stated, “All of them 
[POWs] will be accepted, employed, allowed to study if they wish…We are taking care of 
everything. Our people, including those being held captive, are showing heroic behavior” (Keller 
1988). While this assurance influenced some, many captured soldiers remained suspicious of 
their former government’s true intentions and refused to return12. 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA  
The Soviet Union failed to recognize the potency of psychological trauma in the military. 
Disorders such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), acute stress disorder, and various 
other anxiety disorders were not even recognized, let alone treated. One ex-Soviet soldier 
observed, “In the United States there are 186 psychological rehabilitation centers open to help 
Vietnam veterans. But where are we in the Soviet Union to go for help? We don’t even have one 
such center” (Tamarov 2001, 7). As in all wars, many servicemen in Afghanistan suffered mental 
                                                          
12 Some of the skepticism stemmed from stories such as that of a former GRU agent who defected to the Mujahideen 
and eventually to the West. His former comrades killed him more than a decade after the war had ended 
(Braithwaite 2011, 265). 
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trauma because of the horrors they witnessed, including the atrocities they themselves 
committed. This same soldier recalled: 
I saw houses burned by the Mujahedeen, as well as disfigured bodies of prisoners they’d 
taken. But I saw other things too: villages destroyed by our shelling and bodies of 
women, killed by mistake. [Tamarov 2001, 116]  
 
Without any sort of psychological training or therapy, Soviet soldiers were at the mercy of the 
constant emotional and mental strain of combat. The majority of these soldiers were young men 
who were more susceptible to mental trauma than those who had years to train before going to 
war because they lacked the necessary skills to help them overcome the emotional and mental 
strains of combat (Jameson 2010, 350). Those imprisoned by the Mujahedeen were also 
vulnerable to the psychological effects of Stockholm syndrome, which may have influenced their 
unexpected dedication to a foreign faith and people. 
Soldiers suffering from Stockholm syndrome or even PTSD may have rejected their 
former lives in favor of the lifestyle and beliefs of their captors. It is possible that Islam provided 
these prisoners with an outlet for their frustrations. As they searched for any source of release or 
liberation, Islam may have suggested a spiritual freedom, one that provided them with structure 
and a reprieve from the difficulties of imprisonment. This is especially relevant to Soviet 
conscripts who had an Islamic heritage, who were from the Caucasus and Central Asia.  
 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is a condition that results from prolonged exposure to 
psychological trauma. Psychological trauma refers to harmful or potentially deadly situations 
that produce feelings of helplessness or intense fear or horror (Ozer 2004, 169). While one 
traumatic event is sufficient to produce symptoms of PTSD, 
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The greater the number of various types of traumatic events experienced by an individual 
(e.g., torture, fighting, shelling, abduction, abuse/rape…), the more likely the individual 
[is] to have PTSD, with more pronounced symptoms. [Kolassa 2007]  
 
Significantly, it is irrelevant whether the victim of PTSD experiences these traumatic events 
himself or herself or simply sees them happening to others. What matters most is the individual’s 
proximity to the disaster, the shocking nature of the event, and the frequency with which these 
events occur (Horowitz 1990, 25). Symptoms of PTSD include sleep disturbances, 
hallucinations, paranoia, increased startle reaction, and confusion. Victims also report feelings of 
survivor’s guilt, rage at attackers, and fear (Horowitz 1990, 33).  
 Soldiers serving in Afghanistan were exposed to an ample number of traumatic events. 
The war was a bloody one, and many reported seeing their friends killed or horrifically maimed. 
Soviet soldiers also witnessed gruesome scenes in Afghan villages and towns. As noted above, 
many women and children were killed, and the bodies were sometimes terribly disfigured. 
Additionally, many soldiers experienced traumatic events directly. Injuries were common and 
adequate medical treatment scarce. Hazing and abuse was a prominent part of army life. Some 
soldiers were captured by the Mujahedeen and faced with the horrifying prospects of possible 
torture and death. Others were arrested by the Soviet military and subjected to torture for their 
misconduct.  
Undoubtedly, a substantial quantity of Soviet servicemen suffered from the effects of 
PTSD. Many family members noted significant changes in soldiers returning from Afghanistan. 
These alterations ranged from minor sleep disturbances to excessive paranoia and personality 
changes. Without medical assistance, many Afghan War veterans suffered with PTSD for the 
rest of their lives. Soviet POWs were also affected. Several prisoners reported reoccurring 
nightmares and periods of chronic distress (Thorne 1986, 4). Others exhibited significant 
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personality changes made apparent through their changes in mood, ethos, and belief system. 
Soldiers who rejected their former lives to settle in Afghanistan are particularly suspect for 
PTSD or another psychological disorder as these substantial alterations were likely influenced by 
psychological trauma. 
 
Stockholm Syndrome 
Stockholm syndrome refers to the psychological phenomenon in which victims of 
traumatic physical and emotional stress bond with their captors in such a way that they do not 
condemn those who have offended them, but rather defend them and have intense feelings for 
them. While it is impossible to quantify the extent to which Stockholm syndrome played a role in 
the actions of Soviet POWs, it is likely that the conditions required to produce the disorder were 
present during the Soviet-Afghan War.  
There are several factors that contribute to the development of Stockholm syndrome 
(Cantor 2007, 379). First of all, a hostage’s life must be threatened or he or she must believe that 
his or her life is in danger. Physical and emotional abuse and, particularly, the execution of a 
fellow hostage tend to escalate this fear. Following their capture, prisoners generally must 
observe some act of mercy in their oppressor, and “under such circumstances, any act of 
kindness on the part of the captors or even the absence of beatings, abuse, or rape lead victims to 
see their captors as ‘good guys’” (Adorjan 2012, 458). The victim must also be kept in seclusion 
and completely separated from the outside world without any possibility of escape. This 
internment could be corporal or psychological, meaning the hostage might be physically 
restrained or simply believe that there is nowhere else to go.  
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In their weakened psychological state, Soviet POWs were susceptible to Stockholm 
syndrome. They undoubtedly feared for their lives. The sheer fact that they were imprisoned by 
enemy forces would have impressed upon them the inevitability of their death. As for small 
kindnesses, several POWs reported that they received fairly humane treatment from their captors 
(Thorne 1986, 4). Often, this kindness at the hands of their enemies juxtaposed harshly with the 
abuse Soviet soldiers experienced from their own comrades. Kept in isolation deep in 
Afghanistan, it is unlikely that these prisoners received any news from home or heard anything 
about the Soviet’s campaign. The First Secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party warned of 
cultural relations with foreigners because, through such relationships, Western powers “make use 
of individual renegades, who have betrayed the Motherland, or of religious extremists and 
fanatics” (Гапуров 1981).  Most POWs undoubtedly felt escape was improbable13. They were 
physically restrained in enemy territory and unable to return home. Even if escape were possible, 
many prisoners, as explained above, felt they could never return for fear of prosecution and 
imprisonment14. Under these circumstances, it is likely that some POWs developed symptoms of 
Stockholm syndrome, which may have contributed to a rejection of former lifestyles in favor of a 
new reality. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 There is one instance of a secret Pakistani prison uprising in which Soviet POWs attempted to escape but were 
killed by Mujahedeen and Pakistani regular army soldiers. The event was covered up by both the Pakistani and 
Soviet governments  (Braithwaite 2011, 266-7). 
14 “There is no record of any [POWs] being shot” upon their return to the Soviet Union, although the Western media 
routinely predicted this punishment (Braithwaite 2011, 259). 
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PART III: CASE STUDIES 
“The main motive for the soldiers to honestly and faithfully perform their duty, may be 
only a deep awareness of the righteousness of the cause they serve” (Дубовой 2004, 17). 
The following case studies are a collection of both official and personal accounts of 
Soviet POWs in Afghanistan. These accounts reflect signs of psychological trauma, 
disillusionment, and the defector relating to his captors, before conversion to Islam. I chose the 
most compelling documented accounts but did not limit these to those who remained in 
Afghanistan indefinitely. In order to limit biases of the time and changes in personal 
perspectives, I tried to use cases such as that of Genady Tseuma that were documented over a 
long period of time (1986 and 2009).  
 
Mohammad Beg 
 Mohammad Beg was a young private from Tashkent, Uzbekistan. In 1987, he was 
serving in a remote outpost near Kabul and became involved in a dispute with an officer. After 
beating the officer unconscious, Beg deserted his post and found refuge in a village for a short 
time before being handed over to the Mujahedeen (Time Magazine 1988). Following his capture, 
Beg enjoyed relative freedom. Already a Muslim, Beg was respected and treated with dignity by 
his fellow followers of Islam. Despite captivity, Beg expressed absolutely no desire to return to 
his native Uzbekistan. Instead, he said, “I’d like to stay in Afghanistan and find a job…I’m free 
here…As a Muslim, I’m not oppressed” (Time Magazine 1988). 
 Beg’s decision to remain in Afghanistan stems from his fear of punishment or execution 
for his actions against his superior. Because of his violence and insubordination, Beg would 
likely face a prison sentence and possibly execution if returned to Uzbekistan. His desertion only 
compounds his criminal action. Additionally, Beg is socially accepted and free to conduct his life 
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in the manner he chooses. While in captivity, he is free to travel with an accompanying guard 
and is not compelled to take up arms. Because of his ethnicity and religion, he is able to associate 
freely with the Afghan-Uzbek population. These ethnic ties give him the feeling that he is 
surrounded by friends and family who share his beliefs and traditions. As Beg notes himself, his 
shared Muslim identity influenced his decision to remain in Afghanistan rather than return to his 
native Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union.  
 
Sergei Busov  
 Sergei Busov was a member of the ever-prominent poor working class in the Soviet 
Union. He and his parents shared a communal apartment in Perm. He recalled, “We were 
allocated a room which was 14 square meters. Living in such cramped quarters, we couldn’t 
even dream of a three-room apartment, not to speak of a happy life” (Thorne 1986, 35). Before 
the war, Busov worked as a welder in a factory but dreamed of becoming a truck driver. He was 
learning to drive a truck when he was drafted into the army: 
On April 2, 1983, I was taken into the army. I was literally taken, because no one asked 
me whether I wanted to go or not. Two months later I was already in Afghanistan, where 
I came face to face with real communism: lying, genocide, lawlessness, humiliation, 
betrayal, servility, etc. [Thorne 1986, 35] 
 
Upon his arrival in Afghanistan, Busov was initially pleased with his assignment to drive a food 
delivery truck in Baghram. However, he quickly grew dissatisfied with life in the Soviet Army. 
He deserted and “voluntarily laid down [his] arms and joined the resistance, in hope of finding 
freedom” (Thorne 1986, 35). After participating in a number of skirmishes against the Soviets, 
Busov was granted asylum in Canada in 1986 (Prosser 1986b). 
 Busov named several reasons for his desertion. He was particularly shocked when he 
discovered the blatant differences between Soviet propaganda and the actual state of warfare in 
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Afghanistan. He recalled, “When I was still in basic training I was told that in Afghanistan I 
would find American and Chinese mercenaries…after I arrived in Baghram I asked an older 
soldier about this and he told me to throw this idea out of my head” (Thorne 1986, 18). Busov 
disliked being forced to take action against the Afghan people because he arrived there with the 
intention of protecting them. He was also shocked by the scale of violence and high casualties, 
none of which were reported in the Soviet Union. In addition, Busov was disturbed by the system 
of dedovshchina in the ranks of the Soviet soldiers. He disliked his role as a green recruit 
because “the new recruits are treated like servants” (Thorne 1986, 23). He, along with all other 
new recruits, was forced to do much of the work for the more experienced soldiers. He resented 
this unfairness, and it deepened his antipathy towards the USSR. Finally, Busov was angered by 
the inhumane acts of war taking place on behalf of the Soviet Union. He witnessed the Soviet 
Army abuse and humiliate Afghan civilians and even endanger its own troops. On one occasion, 
he remembered:  
An Afghan village was being bombed by the USSR…Why would they want to bomb this 
village, which was just six kilometers from a major military unit? I asked myself. All of 
this influenced me in my decision to defect. [Thorne 1986, 24]  
 
This blatant disregard for human life—both Afghan and Soviet—seems to have been one of the 
primary driving forces behind Busov’s desertion. 
 It is not clear from his story whether he deserted the Soviet Army with the intention of 
joining the Mujahedeen or if he was simply captured by them and then took up their cause. He 
certainly seemed to have developed a significant emotional bond with his Afghan companions. 
In a letter to President Reagan, he wrote: 
I completely support the Afghan partisans and their just struggle for their country’s 
freedom. We have spent many sleepless, anxious nights together under one sky, and we 
have shared the last crumbs of bread and the last drops of water. [Thorne 1986, 35] 
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Although there is no way to be certain, this kind of connection certainly denotes a deep, lasting 
relationship like the one formed in a Stockholm syndrome scenario. 
 But in the end, it seems that Busov’s defection was ultimately driven by the hardship and 
struggles he endured throughout his young life and during the war. His difficult childhood and 
limited prospects, combined with the humiliation he endured as a soldier, sealed his resentment 
against the Soviet Union. He wrote: 
A human being is so created that he is constantly dreaming of a good, happy life and all 
of his life he strives toward that dream. But what can you do with this dream in a country 
where a person is considered merely as a cheap working unit? [Thorne 1986, 35] 
 
Busov mentions the need for a happy life several times during his narrative. It appears that he 
struggled with a desire for happiness and fulfillment throughout his young life and deserted the 
Red Army in an effort to find it. 
 
Nikolai Bystrov 
 Captured by the Mujahedeen in 1983, Nikolai Bystrov underwent harsh treatment for his 
first six months as a POW (Braithwaite 2011, 262). Given the chance to emigrate to the West, he 
chose instead to remain with the famous Tajik warlord Ahmad Shah Masood15. Bystrov’s 
decision to live in Afghanistan with Masood made him a legend in his own right. Ironically, this 
former Soviet soldier would become the protector of Masood, a leading opposition figure to the 
Soviets and later the Taliban. Bystrov married a Tajik woman from Masood’s tribe in 1986, 
affirming his allegiance to Masood, to whom he would serve as a bodyguard for the next decade 
(Braithwaite 2011, 262). Bystrov returned to Russia with his wife in 1995 to evade the Taliban, 
                                                          
15 Unfortunately, I was unable to find any information as to why he made this decision, other than the fact Bystrov 
deeply respected Masood. 
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but would later visit his in-laws in Afghanistan and arrange for the remains of Soviet KIA (killed 
in action) to be returned to Russia (Braithwaite 2011, 262).  
 
Taras Derevliany 
 Taras Derevliany was a young Ukrainian soldier from the Yaroviv, Lviv region. He was 
drafted into the army in November 1986 and trained as an operator and gunner on an armored 
personnel carrier. He was sent to guard the Kabul-Jalalabad highway in Afghanistan. Just a few 
short months after his deployment began, Derevliany deserted the army on July 2, 1987 
(Kolomayets 1988). Three days later, he found a group of Mujahedeen hiding in the mountains 
and joined them. 
 Derevliany is unique because, after deserting, he began actively campaigning for the end 
of the Soviet-Afghan War. He published leaflets and distributed pamphlets persuading other 
soldiers to desert the army and join his crusade against the war. He encouraged them to actively 
protest and “refuse to serve in this country, start collecting petitions in your platoons, in your 
companies and battalions, under the heading ‘Stop the War and Withdraw Soviet Forces from 
Afghanistan’” (Kolomayets 1988). Derevliany knew from experience that the army was already 
having trouble with dissatisfaction and controversy among its ranks. He played upon this discord 
by reminding soldiers of their morality and duty. He wrote, “Refuse to take part in this senseless 
and shameful war, stop fighting and annihilating the Afghan people. Remember that if you will 
not do this, this shame will stain you like a black blemish” (Kolomayets 1988).  
Derevliany reminded soldiers of their sense of humanity and berated them for their 
violence against the Afghan people. He repeatedly insisted that the Soviet soldiers belonged at 
home, fixing the growing problems in the USSR. He felt that the real war was being carried out 
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at the home front, and the Soviet-Afghan War was merely a distraction and a diversion. He 
entreated: 
Remember that you are needed to defend your own country, your own people and your 
own families, and not to suppress other nations…Just think, aren’t the peoples of the 
USSR exploited, aren’t Soviet people subjected to violence and repressions? Haven’t all 
of the peoples of the USSR, without exception, lost their cultures, their religions, their 
customs and national independence? [Kolomayets 1988] 
 
Derevliany claimed that the Soviet Union was suffering from the very same maladies it was 
supposedly addressing in Afghanistan, only the Soviet government was the source of the 
infirmity. He insisted that ending the Soviet-Afghan War would help correct the situation. He 
believed that once these disgruntled soldiers returned home, their eyes would be opened to the 
duplicity of their government, and they would insist upon a better system. 
 It is difficult to ascertain exactly why Derevliany deserted the army, although he does 
mention the plight of the Afghan people several times in his propaganda materials. It is possible 
that he witnessed some war atrocities that influenced his campaign on their behalf. However, it 
also seems that Derevliany came to Afghanistan already overwhelmed with feelings of 
discontent and frustration with the Soviet government. The situation in Afghanistan only 
reinforced these concerns. Certainly, his displeasure with the Soviet Union motivated his 
decision to join the Mujahedeen and promote an end to the war. Nevertheless, Derevliany does 
not seem to take issue with the Soviet people. Instead, his condemnation seems to have been 
focused squarely on the communistic government he believed was undermining his homeland.   
 
Bakhretdin Khakimov 
Private Bakhretdin Khakimov volunteered for service to fight in Afghanistan in 1980 
(Kelly 2013). Not long after arriving in Afghanistan, Khakimov was wounded and left for dead. 
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Fortunately, the Mujahedeen provided him with two French doctors who nursed him back to 
health. During his months of recovery, Khakimov was uncertain about his future. He had heard 
rumors that the Mujahedeen tortured and killed captured soldiers. “I didn’t know whether they 
were going to put me in prison, torture me or kill me,” he recalled (Kelly 2013). However, his 
fears were never realized, and his encounter with the Mujahedeen proved to be quite the 
opposite. Eventually, his personal experience with Muslim compassion led him to religious 
conversion.  
Like many Soviet soldiers, the 20-year-old private smoked cigarettes. Seeing him 
struggling with withdrawal, the Mujahedeen would purchase cigarettes for him from the nearest 
store, a two-day donkey ride away. Khakimov reflected that, while the efforts of the French 
doctors saved his life, the Afghans saved his soul (Kelly 2013). Soon thereafter he converted to 
Islam and adopted the name Sheikh Abdullah, which he continues to use today. Khakimov 
embraced Islam and the Mujahedeen cause. He played an essential role in fighting Soviet forces 
near Herat and believed that he was fighting al-jihad  al-asghar, the jihad  against the infidels. 
He said, “I knew [Soviet] tactics so I was a teacher for the Mujahidin16” (Kelly 2013). During the 
conflict, he killed many Soviet soldiers. Following the war, an Afghan village adopted him as 
their son and he was able to successfully assimilate into the Afghan culture after converting to 
Islam and learning Dari.  
He was finally reunited with his family back home in Ukraine, albeit by telephone (Kelly 
2013). No matter how difficult the emotional situation was, the former Red Army soldier would 
not return to his native land. “It’s not possible for [Ukraine] to forgive me. It is not like 
Afghanistan, where you can pay money to avoid the law. I will be punished back there” (Kelly 
                                                          
16 Alternate spelling of Mujahedeen, as cited in Kelly’s quote. 
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2013). The words exchanged attest to some of the feelings Khakimov felt during the trying 
decades of his past. 
While Khakimov did not willingly desert the Soviet Army, he developed a deep affinity 
for Afghanistan and Islam. Although he does express some fear of prosecution in Ukraine, 
Khakimov may also have experienced some psychological trauma. He felt completely—and was 
quite literally—abandoned by his Soviet comrades and was frightened by the Mujahedeen, 
whom he had been warned would torture and kill him. He was shocked to discover that they not 
only treated him with kindness, but went out of their way to look out for his well-being. 
Experiencing such significant mental strain while in isolation could very well have led to 
symptoms of Stockholm syndrome. Khakimov felt that his eyes were opened to the true nature of 
the Afghan War. He believed that the oppressive communists were assaulting his kind, well-
meaning protectors, and he took up arms in their defense.  
 
Igor Kovalchuk and Nikolai Golovin 
 These two POWs deserted the Soviet Army together and were then captured and held by 
the Mujahedeen. Igor Kovalchuk was a factory worker from Kharkov. Although he had 
aspirations of becoming an aviation officer like his father, he was unable to enter the program 
because of his academic performance. Instead, he took employment at an aviation factory 
(Prosser 1986a). When he was twenty years old, Kovalchuk received a summons to the 
recruitment center. He had already deferred the army’s call twice and thus had no choice but to 
accept the call. He enlisted into the army (Prosser 1986a). Upon reaching Afghanistan, he was 
assigned to a reconnaissance unit and participated in a number of skirmishes. 
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Nikolai Golovin was born in Ulanovsk on January 30, 1962. He was trained as an 
electrician and also did some work as a chauffeur (Thorne 1986, 40). Upon the completion of his 
electrician training, he was assigned to work at a hotel under construction for the 1980 Olympics. 
Several months later, he received his summons from the Soviet Army. Making no attempt to 
avoid the draft, Golovin promptly went to the local recruitment center and enlisted. He 
remembered:  
I was a kid. What did I know about what kind of a war was going on? I just went to the 
draft board and went through all the formalities. I was told to come back in two weeks 
with all my baggage packed. [Prosser 1986a]  
 
Golovin was deployed to Afghanistan, but unlike Kovalchuk, he saw very little combat. 
Shortly after arriving in Afghanistan, Golovin developed typhoid fever and was sent to 
the army hospital. There, he met an ailing Kovalchuk who was suffering from dysentery. The 
two men quickly became friends, and Kovalchuk began to share his combat experiences with 
Golovin. Kovalchuk was part of a reconnaissance company in Afghanistan. His responsibility 
was to fire a machine gun attached to the back of an armored vehicle. He did not enjoy this duty, 
and the violence he witnessed had a serious impact on him. He recalled, “After I pulled the 
trigger and looked through the viewfinder I could see people’s heads rolling off like watermelons 
and their bodies ripped apart, like pieces of raw meat” (Thorne 1986, 7). As Kovalchuk 
continued to participate in several extremely violent maneuvers, he became disenchanted with 
the Soviet Union.  
One event in particular reshaped Kovalchuk’s opinion of the Red Army. Roughly six 
months after his arrival in Afghanistan, he was riding in an armored personnel carrier (APC) 
with several other soldiers and some young Russian women from a travelling entertainment 
troop. The driver of the APC wanted to impress the girls and started driving faster. Two young 
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Afghan children—a boy and a girl—were crossing the street in front of the vehicle. The driver 
made no attempt to avoid the children. The girl managed to escape the APC, but the boy was run 
down and killed. Kovalchuk reflected: 
It was done in such a callous way. I was shaken. An innocent child had been killed; the 
driver and I saw that we had killed a child. And yet it didn’t arouse any feelings on the 
part of the driver. That was the first incident that made me antagonistic to what we were 
doing in Afghanistan. I asked to be transferred to another company, and I was; but it 
didn’t get any better. What I saw after that in Afghanistan was worse and worse and 
worse. [Prosser 1986a] 
 
Kovalchuk’s experience worsened as he witnessed other war atrocities. Once, while 
riding in a convoy of APCs, he noticed the driver of the second vehicle was heavily intoxicated 
and driving erratically. The driver crashed into the back of the first vehicle and killed two 
soldiers and severed the legs of a third. One of the deceased soldiers was from Kovalchuk’s 
hometown (Thorne 1986, 7). Another time, Kovalchuk participated in an attack on an Afghani 
village. He was ordered by his commander to fire upon a small village hut. Then his commander 
threw a grenade into the dwelling. After the explosion, Kovalchuk “peeked inside and saw about 
fifteen people, men, women and children, all slouched together in a pile of blood. It was like a 
butcher shop, reeking with a horrible smell” (Thorne 1986, 8). On yet another occasion, after 
Kovalchuk’s company captured twelve Mujahedeen, the same commander ordered that the 
prisoners be tied up and placed in the path of three APCs. The prisoners’ bodies were torn to 
shreds by the armored vehicles, and Kovalchuk was one of the soldiers ordered to bury the 
remains in a shallow grave. Later, after the commander had been drinking, he dug up one of the 
heads of the prisoners, lit it with benzene, and threw it into a pot (Thorne 1986, 9). 
 These and other brutal undertakings left Kovalchuk feeling disillusioned with the war. In 
a letter he wrote to President Reagan, he explained: 
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I, Igor Kovalchuk, did not want to kill children and women; I did not want God to judge 
me for having spilled blood. In Afghanistan, I learned to understand the entire Soviet 
government system, and learned to hate the violence that man can exert over man. 
[Thorne 1986, 40] 
 
Kovalchuk’s dissatisfaction with life in Afghanistan had an impact on Golovin as well. He 
remarked, “I started also becoming disenchanted. That’s when we started giving help and arms to 
the Mujahedeen” (Prosser 1986a). 
 While still serving in the Soviet Army, Kovalchuk and Golovin made contact with a 
Mujahedeen fighter who agreed to transport them to Pakistan in exchange for weapons. When 
they met with the Mujahedeen to deliver the weapons, they were spotted by a passing Afghan 
who turned them over to the Soviets. The two men were imprisoned in a Soviet military prison 
for three months. During that time, they both experienced severe forms of abuse. Golovin was 
beaten over the head with a wooden mallet, and Kovalchuk’s left arm was repeatedly cut with 
razor blades and then two wires connected to a 24 volt battery were inserted into the wounds 
(Thorne 1986, 11). Eventually, they managed to escape and took refuge with the Mujahedeen. At 
first they were treated quite well, but eventually, they were sold to another group of fighters. 
This second group was not as kind to the POWs and kept them under guard at all times (Prosser 
1986b). 
 After their capture, Kovalchuk and Golovin struggled with the monotony of 
imprisonment. To deal with the extreme boredom, both men smoked hashish, and eventually 
became addicted. In an effort to gain asylum in the West, both men later conquered their 
addiction. Kovalchuk explained, “Please try to put yourself into my place, and think what it was 
like, to sit all this time within the walled confines of a mud hut” (Thorne 1986, 40). Several 
times, both men made attempts to gain asylum in Western countries. Initially, Canada offered a 
promising opportunity, but both POWs were denied entrance, apparently because of their drug 
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addiction (Prosser 1986a). After the two men managed to stop using drugs, they were granted 
asylum in Ottawa, Canada.  
 Both of these POWs, and especially Kovalchuk, expressed a deep dissatisfaction with the 
Soviet Army.  Poor living conditions, inaccurate Soviet propaganda, and the horrors Kovalchuk 
witnessed in the war all likely contributed to this discontent. From the beginning, both men 
apparently received inadequate health care. Golovin developed typhoid fever almost as soon as 
he arrived in Afghanistan, while Kovalchuk suffered from a common Afghan malady: dysentery. 
It was while both men were ailing from these diseases that they began to plan their desertion. 
Additionally, a number of Kovalchuk’s war experiences involved soldiers who were intoxicated. 
Both men found the common alcohol and drug abuse in the Soviet Army disgusting and pathetic.  
They were also shocked to discover the reality of war in Afghanistan. Kovalchuk, especially, 
seems to have questioned the validity of the Soviet Union’s presence and expressed a sense of 
horror at the mistreatment of Afghan civilians. He could not find a purpose for the violence he 
saw around him. In a poem he wrote during his imprisonment, he questioned: 
Why are we here, 
Killing simple people, 
Conquering their land? 
After all, they are 
Defending their homes. [Thorne 1986, 9] 
 
Thus, the primary reason these young soldiers left their Soviet comrades appears to have been 
the horrific scenes Kovalchuk witnessed in battle. In particular, he seems to have been struck 
with the inhumane actions and ideals of his fellow soldiers. He was both dismayed and repulsed 
by the contemptuous attitudes many of his comrades had toward the Afghan people. He feared 
that too many Soviet soldiers were violent and bloodthirsty, and the treatment he received in a 
Soviet military prison undoubtedly confirmed these suspicions. After Kovalchuk communicated 
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his revulsion with Golovin, the two decided to risk facing the condemnation of the Soviet Union 
and deserted the army. 
 
Sergei Krasnoperov 
Sergei Krasnoperov was a young Russian from Korgan who was assigned to work with 
Army supplies and ammunition. Soon after he arrived in Afghanistan, he grew disillusioned with 
the Soviet-Afghan War. He recalled, “I came to Afghanistan to fight, to serve my country as a 
soldier…I didn’t know my government was killing people here and that’s what my task would 
be. Either you kill or you are killed. That’s what being a soldier means” (Starkey 2011). 
Krasnoperov decided to take advantage of his access to Soviet weaponry and began to sell it to 
the Mujahedeen. In 1984, he was caught for the second time. Rather than face prosecution, 
Krasnoperov deserted the Soviet Army. He explained, “If I hadn’t escaped, they would have put 
me in prison…I had to escape and join the Mujaheddin17. I climbed into the hills and found some 
fighters. They welcomed me and I joined them” (Starkey 2011). 
Not long after joining the Mujahedeen, Krasnoperov converted to Islam and began to 
assist the holy warriors. Although he did not actively participate in battles, he supported the 
Mujahedeen by repairing equipment, recovering ammunition, preparing supplies, and teaching 
the Afghans about Soviet weaponry. At one time, he remembered assisting Afghan fighters to 
take on Soviet helicopters: “Tanks and helicopters were harassing us a lot, so I fixed their 
machine guns when they jammed and I repaired the artillery as well. We hit many helicopters 
and scared the pilots, so after a while they stopped coming” (Starkey 2011). Krasnoperov also 
spent some time serving as a body guard for Abdul Rashid Dostum (Wendle 2012). 
                                                          
17 Alternate spelling of Mujahedeen, as cited in Starkey’s quote. 
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Following the war, Krasnoperov chose to stay in Afghanistan. He changed his name to 
Noor Muhammad and learned the local language of Dari. He married an Afghan woman and 
settled in Chaghcharan. He has six children and works as a repairman. In 2012, he reported that 
he had absolutely no desire to return to Russia:  
Russia is no longer the big world power that it was…People don’t have jobs and they’re 
going hungry. I’ve gotten used to the people here and the country…My family would 
have problems in my old homeland but here even the Taliban accept and respect me the 
way I am. I have an Afghan passport and I’m a proud Afghan. [Hasrat-Nazimi 2012] 
 
Krasnoperov quickly adopted the Afghan people as his own, rejecting the life and culture of his 
youth. He is entirely and completely loyal to this new culture and way of life. Recalling his 
defection to the Mujahedeen, Krasnoperov stated, “They took me in and I became part of their 
movement—jihad against the unbelievers” (Hasrat-Nazimi 2012). Despite Krasnoperov’s ethnic 
and familial ties to Russia, he believes that Afghanistan is the best place for him and his family. 
He still speaks regularly over the telephone with his mother and only brother living in Russia.  
 Krasnoperov deserted the Soviet Army due to his lack of commitment to the communist 
cause. He balked at the horror and violence of warfare, and he resented the Red Army that forced 
him to participate. He noted the army’s gruesome acts against Afghan civilians and left to defend 
them. Following his desertion, Krasnoperov spent a great deal of time working with the 
Mujahedeen. During this time period, he displayed a complete reversal in his belief system as he 
went from an atheist lifestyle to pious one. By his own admission, Krasnoperov was not at all 
religious before he was taken in by the Mujahedeen. He remembered, “I wasn’t religious before. 
We didn’t respect anything except for vodka and girls. My parents were Christian, but I was 
interested in other things. I was young” (Hasrat-Nazimi 2012). However, after living among the 
Afghan resistance, Krasnoperov converted to Islam and became very devout. Though he does not 
provide a reason for his conversion, this sudden change in his religious zeal may have been due 
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to some serious mental and psychological stress brought on by the war and his isolation with the 
freedom fighters. He completely rejected his former life in favor of one among the Afghan 
people and proved himself fully committed to his new home. 
 
Alexander Levenets 
Alexander Levenets was a young Ukrainian teenager from Melovadka when he was 
drafted into the Soviet Army. He was initially pleased to escape the difficulties of providing for 
his blind mother and diabetic older brother. However, he was soon faced with the reality of the 
Soviet-Afghan War. After he was deployed to an airbase in Kunduz, Levenets became a victim 
of dedovshchina and suffered from the systematic abuse that many new Soviet recruits 
experienced (Narziev 2005). Eventually, the stress became too much, and he betrayed the army. 
After he was caught providing weapons to the enemy, Levenets escaped from the Soviet Army 
and found the Mujahedeen. He had been warned that they would abuse and torture all Soviet 
prisoners, but instead, Levenets found that the freedom fighters were welcoming and 
accommodating. In a complete rejection of his homeland, he took up weapons alongside the 
Mujahedeen and fought against the Soviets. When explaining to a reporter why he had turned 
against his old comrades, he stated, “I had hatred toward them and treated them as they had 
treated me” (Doucet 2009).  
After converting to Islam, Levenets changed his name to Ahmed. He married a Tajik-
Afghan woman and has six daughters. After the war, he remained in Afghanistan and still 
actively practices Islam. He currently works as a taxi driver in Kunduz (Wendle 2012).Years 
after his desertion, Levenets is still completely committed to his new religion and his new 
family. He speaks to reporters in Dari, and explains that there is absolutely no reason for him to 
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return to Ukraine. His mother and only brother have since passed away. He told a reporter, “Here 
I have relatives, my clan…my wife’s brothers are helping me. They respect me; they need me. 
Who needs me back home? Mother passed away waiting for me” (Narziev 2005). Levenets 
continues to observe all of the facets of Islam, wears a beard, dresses in the traditional Afghan 
garb, and keeps his wife out of the eye of strangers.  
 Levenets left the Soviet Army because he disliked the cruelty he experienced at its hand. 
Although he does not elaborate on the specific abuses he was subjected to, he insists that the 
Soviet military mistreated and misused him repeatedly. However, it is difficult to pinpoint 
exactly what prompted Levenets to convert to Islam and fight alongside the Mujahedeen. It 
appears that he was at least given the option of not fighting and simply living with his rescuers in 
peace, but instead opted to participate in the warfare and converted to Islam after only one month 
(Narziev 2005). It is likely that some form of traumatic bonding contributed to his conversion 
during his weeks of isolation with the Mujahedeen. It certainly seems that these Afghans treated 
Levenets with a kindness he had not found among the Soviets. His hatred and resentment 
towards the Soviet Army undoubtedly played a large role in his desire to fight the communists. 
 
Nikolai Movchan 
 Nikolai Movchan was a young Ukrainian trained in furniture making and woodworking. 
Drafted into the army, he served as a sergeant in Ghazni where his platoon was part of an 
antitank unit assigned to guard the headquarters of their regiment. Because of this assignment, 
Movchan saw very little action in Afghanistan as the Mujahedeen did not have access to tanks 
and other sophisticated equipment. After arriving in Afghanistan, he became disillusioned with 
Soviet propaganda. He would eventually appear before the US House of Representatives in 
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1985, which was instrumental in formulating American opinion on the Soviet-Afghan War. He 
recalled to American officials, “When I arrived in Afghanistan as a sergeant in the Soviet Army 
in October 1982, it was not long before all the slogans and appeals of the Soviet leadership lost 
all meaning for me” (US House 1985, 21). “I realized that the war was not the way it was 
described to us back home. I realized it was an unjust war” (Shipler 1986). Movchan rapidly 
became more disillusioned with the military’s attitude toward the Afghan population. Once, his 
superior officer pointed out a nearby village and said that fifty enemy combatants lived there. 
Movchan remembered disagreeing “When I looked, I saw only plain, common folk. I thought, 
‘our big country has invaded this small country, and the people have risen up against us’” 
(Tempest 1984). Movchan also disapproved of the Soviet Union’s military action against Afghan 
villages. Often, in an effort to deter civilians from assisting or joining the Mujahedeen, the Soviet 
Army would retaliate swiftly and ruthlessly: 
On one occasion, a village near our base was destroyed and most of the inhabitants were 
killed by Soviet tanks. Very few escaped. The reason for this attack was because a group 
of “Mujahedeen” had ambushed some Soviet soldiers from this position. This type of 
retaliatory action against the civilian population is the typical response to such 
“Mujahedeen” activities. [US House 1985, 22] 
 
Movchan felt that these acts of revenge were too harsh and endangered the civilian population. 
He was concerned for the welfare of the Afghan people and did not question their right to rebel 
against the foreign nation oppressing them. 
In other instances, Movchan heard of Soviet soldiers deliberately misusing civilians 
simply because they could. He recalled hearing stories of Afghan women and children being 
killed indiscriminately. There were also tales of women being raped and villages looted (Sciolino 
1984). “All of this was hidden away under the official justification that ‘there are no peace-
loving people here; they are all dushmans,’ the enemy” (US House 1985, 22). In the end, 
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Movchan became completely disheartened with the Soviet Union, and one morning in June 
1983, he escaped while the rest of his unit slept. He was pursued by helicopters and tanks but 
found refuge with an Afghan civilian (Shipler 1986). Movchan was held for one year by the 
Mujahedeen, after which he was granted asylum in the United States. Upon his arrival, he spent 
some time actively campaigning for Soviet POWs still held in Afghanistan (Thorne 1986, 31). 
 Movchan’s account is an important one because his story was heavily cited in the 1980s 
and was influential in framing the American perspective on the Afghan-Soviet War. His claims 
are obviously biased, since he was granted asylum in the United States just before he spoke in 
the committee hearing, but his accounts correlate with those of his compatriot defectors and 
should be treated as such. Movchan deserted the Red Army because he was disappointed with 
the Soviet Union’s propaganda and aggressive military tactics against Afghan civilians. 
However, it also seems that his desertion was not a well-planned affair, more of a spontaneous 
decision. When questioned about his desertion, he explained that “I left the Soviet Army because 
there was a possibility to do so. At the exact moment of defection, I really don’t know what 
happened. It just kind of did” (US House 1985, 27). At the heart of this split-second decision was 
Movchan’s discontent with the Soviet Army. He was dissatisfied with the actions and attitudes of 
his fellow soldiers towards the civilian population. He questioned the legitimacy of the Soviet 
cause in Afghanistan and felt his nation was destroying a helpless people’s way of life. In the 
end, Movchan could not bear to live with the bigotry and violence of the Red Army and elected 
to leave it behind.  
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Vladislav Naumov  
 Vladislav Naumov was born and raised in Volgograd. Before he enlisted in the army, he 
was a chief mate on a merchant vessel on the Volga River. After receiving a summons from the 
Soviet Army, Naumov enlisted and was sent to boot camp in Turkmenistan. While there, he was 
trained as a sharpshooter and to operate a tank. He was also one of the select few chosen to work 
in the “Lenin Room” where he helped to create Soviet propaganda posters and slogans. He was 
also subjected to special political training and indoctrination regarding Lenin’s teachings, 
writings, and political motivations. He was advised to watch his fellow soldiers carefully and 
note any possible signs of dissension or anti-communistic attitudes (Thorne 1986, 14). As a 
result of his role in the Lenin Room, many of the other soldiers disliked Naumov because they 
felt he held a “cushy” position and was willing to report on his fellow soldiers. 
 After his military training, Naumov spent some time in combat as a sniper, but he served 
mainly as a guard and tank mechanic at a Soviet outpost near Jalalabad. While there, he began to 
become disenchanted with the Soviet-Afghan War. Naumov disliked the violence and gore 
associated with the Soviets’ campaign. He recalled that he would sometimes find bits of human 
flesh and tissue trapped in the treads of the tanks he repaired (Thorne 1986, 15). As he became 
more disheartened, Naumov started to give weapons to the Mujahedeen. In October 1983, he was 
caught by the Soviet Army and transported to a military prison. There, he reported that he was 
severely beaten and tortured, but managed to escape his guards and join the Mujahedeen (Thorne 
1986, 15). 
 As Naumov spent time with the Mujahedeen, his anti-Soviet feelings quickly turned into 
pro-Islamic sentiments. He wrote, “I came to the firm decision that I must live and not simply 
exist. [I] do not want to consider [myself] as [an] animal or [a] mere shadow” (Thorne 1986, 39). 
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He began to write articles describing Soviet military tactics and ideology to distribute among the 
Mujahedeen and the West18. Naumov was also an active participant in approximately twenty 
assaults against the Soviet military. While living with the Mujahedeen, he enjoyed relative 
freedom and was able to move about without any restrictions from his fellow combatants. 
Nevertheless, Naumov still felt confined because he was forced to remain in hiding to avoid 
capture by the Soviets. He wrote several letters to Western officials seeking asylum and was 
eventually granted asylum in Canada. He travelled to Ottawa along with four other POWs in 
1986 (Prosser 1986b). 
 It appears that the factors that led to Naumov’s desertion and complete betrayal of the 
Soviet Union derive from the violence he witnessed in Afghanistan. He was also undoubtedly 
influenced by the part he played in Soviet propaganda. As a participant in the Lenin Room, 
Naumov had a unique perspective on the propaganda materials produced by the USSR. He knew 
exactly what the Soviet Union was telling its people and its soldiers about the Afghan War. He 
developed a sense of disgust for the deception he was forced to participate in and turned against 
his homeland. He wrote: 
The first reason which prompted my escape is that I detested the Soviet way of life and 
the Soviet policy in Afghanistan. The second reason why I took this suicidal step is that I 
wanted to become free…In the USSR I was relatively free to move about, but I did not 
have the opportunity to think, write or live freely. With the Afghan partisans I have 
gained relative freedom of thought, but I have lost the relative freedom of movement. 
[Thorne 1986, 38] 
 
While these issues contributed to Naumov’s decision to desert the Red Army, and seek asylum in 
the West, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what made him decide to join the ranks of the 
Mujahedeen and fight against his former comrades following his capture. Naumov expressed his 
desire for both freedom of thought and freedom of movement. It is possible that he joined the 
                                                          
18 Naumov, trained as a Soviet propagandist, ironically began to use his skills for the opposing side.  
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Mujahedeen in an effort to obtain more freedom and escape the tediousness of being a prisoner 
of war. At one point he remarked, “Our lives have become interesting, they have assumed 
meaning” (Thorne 1986, 17), suggesting that his life before aiding the Mujahedeen was 
meaningless. This penchant for meaning may also point to psychological factors that could have 
influenced his decisions. Whatever his reasons, Naumov represents a bright, young Soviet 
soldier who experienced a full turn-around in his belief system. His experience in the Lenin 
Room and his familiarity with combat led him to desert his Soviet comrades and take up arms 
with the Mujahedeen. 
 
Alexei Olenin 
 The Mujahedeen captured Alexei Olenin in the Salang Pass while relieving himself 
(Braithwaite 2011, 259). His reasoning for converting to Islam was simple: “No one made me do 
it. I simply realized that since I was still alive I must have been preserved by some power…I 
would have adopted any faith that was available: after all, up to then I had been a Young Pioneer, 
a Komsomol, and was preparing to join the Party” (Braithwaite 2011, 259). When he converted 
to Islam, he became known as Rakhmatula. After some time in captivity, Olenin’s slave master 
decided that he should take an Afghan wife, despite local misgivings: “Afghan fathers were 
reluctant to surrender their daughters, because the Russians could not afford the bride price, and 
because they feared that the girls would be dishonored when the Russians eventually abandoned 
them and went home” (Braithwaite 2011, 260). Olenin was engaged to an Afghan when his 
mother arranged for his release in 1994. He returned to Russia for a short time, but then his 
conscience weighed on him. Olenin returned to Afghanistan to marry his betrothed, Nargez, and 
remained there until 2004 (Braithwaite 2011, 260).  
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Aleksei Peresleni 
 Aleksei Peresleni was a young milling operator in Moscow prior to being drafted on May 
11, 1983. He was assigned to command a six-man howitzer crew in Kabul but was shocked at 
the situation in Afghanistan. He was particularly upset by the low morale among the Soviet 
troops and the rampant drug abuse. He remembered, ‘‘Practically everybody uses hashish all the 
time, and some use opium, but you just make sure officers don’t see you when you’re on military 
operations’’ (Sciolino 1984). Peresleni believed the low morale inspiring drug abuse was 
triggered by the men’s lack of real purpose. He believed that the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Afghanistan during a time of peace was unjustified and tyrannical, and he felt that his 
government had misrepresented the role of its military in this struggling nation. He complained, 
‘‘We were told we were being sent to offer friendship and help to the Afghan people…But when 
you’re sent to fight in a time of peace, you can’t feel very good about it” (Sciolino 1984). 
Peresleni also struggled with the humiliation he was subjected to under the tradition of 
dedovshchina. He bitterly recalled, “On my second day, they made me sing and 
dance…Anything to humiliate me. Then they took a huge log and started beating me—for 
nothing. It’s inhuman, animalistic” (Sciolino 1984). One day, all of the strain and misery took its 
toll, and on December 14, 1983, Peresleni simply walked away from guard duty where he had 
been assigned for twenty-four hours straight. He found refuge with the Mujahedeen, and in 1984, 
he received asylum in the United States. 
 Peresleni deserted because he was deeply dissatisfied with life in the Soviet Army. This 
abiding unhappiness stemmed from the degradation he experienced as a new recruit and the 
government’s untruthfulness with its own people. He felt that the Soviets had overstayed their 
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welcome in Afghanistan—if they had ever been welcome in the first place—and were now 
abusing the native people by their presence. Peresleni also expressed disgust for the way soldiers 
treated civilians and how this mistreatment affected the oppressors. ‘‘Some Soviet soldiers,” he 
said, “are so filled with rage that they kill everyone they see… The fighting is very 
indiscriminate” (Sciolino 1984). Peresleni was horrified at the way so many Afghan civilians 
were ruthlessly killed, and was equally disturbed by the changes he saw in his own comrades. 
Too many of his fellow soldiers were developing racist and sadistic tendencies, not to mention 
drug addictions. To escape this fate, Peresleni left the Red Army in search of a new life. 
 
Vadim Plotnikov  
 Vadim Plotnikov was a young factory worker from Moscow who enlisted in the Red 
Army in his early twenties. He was trained as a demolitions expert in a special unit in 
Turkmenistan where he learned to quickly and effectively defuse bombs and to safely evacuate 
people from dangerous situations. Plotnikov claimed that he could defuse any Soviet bomb built 
from 1943 to the Afghan War. However, he found his assignment in Afghanistan to be ironic and 
unnecessary. In 1986 he stated:  
During the past six years of war in Afghanistan I was probably the only demolitions 
expert who was sent there…In Afghanistan it’s the Soviet Union that’s bombing villages 
and, naturally, I wouldn’t be asked to defuse the very same bombs that we were dropping. 
[Thorne 1986, 17] 
 
Instead, Plotnikov believed that he was sent to Afghanistan because he had angered his 
commanding officer. During training in Turkmenistan, Plotnikov had an encounter with his 
platoon leader, which ended with Plotnikov threatening to kill his superior once he was out of the 
army. His platoon leader replied, “No you won’t…because I will send you to a place from which 
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you will never return” (Thorne 1986, 18). Shortly thereafter, Plotnikov received his assignment 
to serve in Afghanistan. 
Plotnikov’s case is unique because, unlike most deserters, he embarked on his tour in 
Afghanistan with the intention of deserting and joining the Mujahedeen. He remarked that he 
was aware of what was really going on in Afghanistan and did not wish to participate. He began 
planning his escape during his basic training. After he completed training, Plotnikov was 
assigned to be a guard at the Jalalabad airport. One day, when he was on guard duty, he just 
walked away. He took with him four automatic weapons and canned food. Plotnikov headed 
towards Pakistan in hopes of discovering a rumored militia group of free Russians fighting 
against the communists. Instead, he found the Mujahedeen. After joining with them, Plotnikov 
participated in several battles against Soviet forces and enlisted his skills as a demolitions expert. 
He applied several times for asylum in various western countries and in 1986 was granted 
asylum in Canada.  
For Plotnikov, the motivation for desertion seems to stem from ideological differences 
and bitterness towards the Soviet Army. He stated, “Never forget that in Afghanistan real 
genocide is taking place…and it has turned out that we [Soviet POWs] too have become victims 
of this war” (Thorne 1986, 25). Plotnikov disagreed with Soviet ideology to begin with. He did 
not believe that the USSR had any right to be in Afghanistan, and, in particular, he felt his 
assignment in Afghanistan was an unworthy one. He also apparently harbored some resentment 
against the platoon leader that originally had him stationed there. Most uniquely, Plotnikov 
deserted the Red Army with the intention of fighting against it and left actively seeking a militia 
group that would enable him to fight what he had come to consider the great communist 
oppressor. 
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Nikolai Ryzhkov 
 When he joined the Soviet Army, Nikolai Ryzhkov was still a very young man. He 
deserted his post shortly after his arrival in Afghanistan, but it is difficult to ascertain exactly 
how and why he deserted because he reported two different scenarios to US and Soviet officials. 
Ryzhkov described the first version of his escape to American representatives when seeking 
asylum in the United States but told another account to Soviet officials after he later returned to 
the Soviet Union.  
When he was still a prisoner of war, Ryzhkov told US officials that, shortly after his 
arrival in Afghanistan, he became disenchanted with the Soviet-Afghan War. He disliked the 
bloodshed and violence of warfare and particularly objected to the inhumane treatment of 
Afghan civilians. In a press conference, he stated, “We were told we would be defending the 
southern border of the Soviet Union and would be facing American and Chinese 
mercenaries…when I arrived, my opinion changed19” (Knutson 1984). He contacted the 
Mujahedeen, and on June 16, 1983, he deserted the Red Army to live with the Afghan resistance 
(National Review 1983). Conversely, when Ryzhkov returned to the USSR, he reportedly told 
Soviet officials that he did not willingly desert the army. Instead, he was ambushed by the enemy 
and held captive against his will. He claimed that American spokesmen told him that he must 
make up stories of Soviet atrocities in order to gain asylum in the United States (Associated 
Press 1988).  
 Whatever his reasons, Ryzhkov obtained asylum in the United States in 1983. He stayed 
in the US just eighteen months before returning to his homeland, apparently because he had 
                                                          
19 See Busov page 43.  
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trouble adjusting to the American language, culture, and lifestyle—although a Russian news 
agency implied that Ryzhkov had become involved in a homosexual relationship with a CIA 
operative that went sour (Los Angeles Times 1985). Ludmilla Thorne, a Freedom House 
employee who was instrumental in bringing Ryzhkov to the United States, believed that he 
returned to Russia because “he didn’t know how to deal with his freedom…He couldn’t hold a 
job. He had three jobs in 1984. They all lasted three weeks, not more. He was drifting. He was a 
free person. He had difficulty dealing with his freedom” (Shipler 1986). Despite assurances of 
safety from the Soviet Ambassador in Washington DC, Ryzhkov was arrested and prosecuted for 
treason shortly after his arrival in the USSR (Keller 1988). He was found guilty of deserting, 
assisting the enemy, and participating in anti-Soviet propaganda (Parks 1988). He was 
condemned to twelve years in a Soviet labor camp, but was released after serving only two. 
It is impossible to ascertain which of Ryzhkov’s stories is true. It is feasible that Ryzhkov 
lied to American representatives in order to gain asylum in the United States. However, it is just 
as likely—if not more so—that he misled Soviet officials in an effort to avoid a prison sentence 
for desertion and treason. Because of the discrepancies in Ryzhkov’s story, it is difficult to 
pinpoint whether he willfully neglected his socialist duty to protect his government’s interests or 
had a change of heart. If his first account is true, Ryzhkov was deeply troubled by the treatment 
of Afghan civilians by the Soviet military. While he did not participate in many conflicts, he 
supposedly listened to Soviet paratroopers complain about the number of Afghan villages they 
were assigned to destroy (National Review 1983). Allegedly, this violence and disregard for 
civilian lives filled him with disgust towards the Soviet Army, leading him to desert. However, if 
the account he gave in the Soviet Union is correct, Ryzhkov was not dissatisfied with army life, 
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at least not enough to defect. Rather, he was forced into captivity and lied to US officials to gain 
asylum.  
 
Yuri Shapovalenko 
 Yuri Shapovalenko was a nineteen-year-old private from Sumy drafted into the Soviet 
Army and assigned to operate a rocket launcher. From the beginning, he felt that life in the army 
was a “very difficult experience” with a lot of “injustice” (Lapychak 1984). He struggled with 
his fellow soldiers’ drug addictions and the illness and disease that permeated the camps because 
of unhygienic conditions. Shapovalenko also reported maltreatment from more tenured soldiers 
and remembered receiving beatings and abuse for no apparent reason. But what affected him the 
most was his certainty that the Afghan people did not want the army there. Shapovalenko had the 
opportunity to work side by side with a unit from the Afghan military. These soldiers, while 
technically on the same side as the Soviets, disliked their Russian supervisors and often did their 
best to undermine them. He remembered, “We would go out on patrol with them and they would 
pretend to be friendly with us during the day…But at night they’d open fire on us” (Sciolino 
1984). Shapovalenko was repeatedly reminded that these Afghan soldiers could not be trusted. 
He explained that many Soviet officers would take the weapons away from these fighters at 
night, especially rocket launchers and anti-tank weapons. While some of these Afghan soldiers 
continued to work with the Soviet Army, “many of course defected to the Mujahedeen” 
(Lapychak 1984). After deserting the army, Shapovalenko was captured by the Mujahedeen, but 
was eventually granted refugee status in the United States. 
Shapovalenko was overwhelmed with the conditions and hardships of army life in 
Afghanistan. The poor health conditions, beatings, and drug abuse all bothered him. However, 
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what he found most disturbing was the irony that the people the Soviet Union was supposedly 
helping clearly did not want them there. Shapovalenko had first-hand knowledge of the Afghan 
population because he worked closely beside them every day. He saw that these soldiers often 
only pretended to support the Soviet initiative, but their first loyalties were to the civilians with 
whom they shared a common heritage and kinship. This falsity troubled Shapovalenko. He 
disliked not knowing whom he could trust and always having to be on his guard. He knew that 
the USSR claimed that the Afghan people wanted its forces there to protect and help them, but he 
also knew that these claims were a complete farce. Overcome with bitterness and discontent, 
Shapovalenko deserted the Soviet Army hoping to find a life that he could finally understand. 
 
Genady Tseuma 
 Genady Tseuma was a young Ukrainian soldier serving near Kunduz. During the ten-
month term of his service, Tseuma struggled with the monotony and boredom that permeated 
Soviet Army life. One day he became curious about the civilian life in Kunduz and decided to go 
exploring. He explained: 
Our checkpoint was close to the village. Every morning the mullah did the call to prayer. 
It was totally new to me. I didn’t understand what was going on. I thought maybe they 
were killing people or something…So, one day, early in the morning, I got off my base to 
take a look. When I got close to the mosque there was an old man sitting there. Then 
suddenly men with guns surrounded me and captured me. After that, the mujahedin20 told 
me to convert to Islam or they would kill me. I decided it was better to live than to die, so 
I became a Muslim. [Wendle 2012] 
 
After converting to Islam, Tseuma adopted the Islamic name Nek Mohammud. Although he was 
pressured to join the Mujahedeen in the fight against the Soviets, Tseuma absolutely refused to 
fire upon his people. He lived as a prisoner in the compound of the local Mujahedeen leader until 
                                                          
20 Alternate spelling of Mujahedeen, as cited in Wendle’s quote. 
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he was finally able to earn his release at the end of the Soviet War. However, instead of returning 
home, Tseuma elected to stay in Afghanistan. He spent several years working as a long-haul 
trucker operating out of Kunduz city. He married a native Afghan-Tajik woman, and the two of 
them had three children.  
 In 2009, Tseuma was reunited with his younger brother Sergei. Sergei was only eleven 
years old when his older brother was conscripted into the army. Sergei travelled to Afghanistan 
to beg his brother to return to Russia and his family. Tseuma recalled, “I wanted to go but my 
wife’s family did not let her. My children are sweet. I could not leave them” (Doucet 2009). 
Although Tseuma still harbors some longing for his homeland, his failing health and the ties he 
fashioned in Afghanistan hold him there.  
 Clearly, Tseuma did not leave his base with the intention of finding the Mujahedeen and 
converting to Islam. However, it appears that, upon his release, he felt he could not return to the 
Soviet Union because of his POW status. “The Soviet government was looking for us, but I 
didn’t let them find me because I didn’t know what they would do to me” (Wendle 2012). He 
feared that he would be legally prosecuted and imprisoned for his capture. Instead, Tseuma 
decided to embrace his ex-captors, continue to live among them, and practice their religion. For 
the most part, it seems he continues to practice Islam in an effort to blend with the local 
population rather than any actual religious commitment. He appears to regret his life in 
Afghanistan but cannot return home without his family. Still, Tseuma misses his homeland. He 
speaks to reporters in Russian and recalls his younger brother Sergei (Doucet 2009). “My parents 
died waiting for me to return,” he explained. “I feel guilty that they suffered because of me—
because I was unable to escape from here” (Narziev 2005).  
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Leonid Vilko 
 The Mujahedeen captured Leonid Vilko, a 24-year-old Moldovan private, in 1984 as he 
was attempting to defect to the West. Shortly after his capture, Vilko became a Muslim “once 
[he] learned the language21” (Time Magazine 1988). This helped him gain relative freedom 
among his captors and allowed him to live peaceably among the Afghans. After he converted to 
Islam, Vilko adopted the Islamic name of Azizullah. As a convert and a POW, he was able to 
frequent local bazaars and engage in recreation with the Mujahedeen.  
 Unfortunately, not much information is available explaining why Vilko deserted the 
Soviet Army. However, it is clear that he intentionally left his post with the purpose of sharing 
Soviet information with the enemy. Whether this was due to mistreatment from his superiors or 
disillusionment with the Soviet cause is unknown. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that he 
originally intended to convert to Islam. In fact, it appears that he was looking for Western 
officials, not the Mujahedeen. Although Vilko does not say exactly what prompted him to 
convert to Islam, he most likely did so in an effort to assimilate with his captors, although 
psychological trauma may also have been a factor. Additionally, Vilko likely feared returning to 
the Soviet Union because of the humiliation and persecution associated with Soviet POWs.  
 
Alexander Voronov 
 Alexander Voronov was a young enlisted soldier in the Red Army. He was assigned to 
work in a propaganda unit that tried to win the support of the Afghan people. This unit designed 
propaganda material and slogans in an effort to raise support for the Soviet cause in Afghanistan. 
In July of 1983, Voronov deserted the army along with another soldier. Both men were captured 
                                                          
21 The language he learned, whether Dari, Pashto or Uzbek, was not specified in the article. 
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and held by the Mujahedeen for five months outside of Kabul (Ledger 1984). During this time, 
both men experienced mistreatment (Los Angeles Times 1985). After five months, they were 
granted asylum in the United States thanks to the effort of the Freedom House organization 
(Thorne 1986, 30). 
 Although there is very little information about Voronov, it appears that he deserted the 
Soviet Union because he became disillusioned with the communist regime. In his propaganda 
unit, Voronov would have had unique access to the psychological manipulation the communists 
directed towards the Afghan people as well as their own citizens. In a US press conference, a 
nineteen-year-old Voronov observed that “nobody [in the Soviet Army] wants to kill innocent 
civilians, and the morale of the soldiers in Afghanistan is extremely low” (Ledger 1984). 
Voronov apparently disliked the violence of the Soviet-Afghan War and seemed to particularly 
object to the treatment of Afghan civilians. His discontent led him to defect in search of asylum 
in the West. 
 
Anatoly Zakharov 
 Anatoly Zakharov was a young student in Leningrad when he was drafted into the Soviet 
Army. Much like other new recruits, he initially did not believe that he would be sent to 
Afghanistan. In fact, he looked forward to the exciting lifestyle he expected to find in the service. 
He remembered, “I thought that I would find friendship there and a good life. Some people 
argued with me, said that army life was bad, but I didn’t believe them” (Rybakov 1983). 
Immediately upon entering the military, Zakharov’s idealistic vision of army life was shattered. 
Almost from the very beginning of his military experience, he encountered the abusive system of 
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dedovshchina. Zakharov’s first experience occurred as he and some other new recruits were 
being transported to their training center. The transport stopped off at a school gymnasium and:  
There the sergeants and the elders [stariki] took away our watches, our money, all our 
valuables, and then they beat us up. I thought that this was some kind of initiation—that 
they beat us and robbed us because we were still civilians. [Rybakov 1983] 
 
Unfortunately, Zakharov was mistaken. Following one month of military training in Tashkent, he 
was transferred to Kabul and assigned to a unit that guarded warehouses. There, the abuse 
continued: 
The elders and the sergeants told us right away, “We were beaten, now we’re going to 
beat you.” They beat us, even while we stood in assembly, mostly with their feet and 
elbows…They did this every day, a few times each day. The sergeants in Kabul were 
worse than any we had run across yet—they were real animals. [Rybakov 1983] 
 
In addition to this physical abuse, Zakharov also struggled with the long hours of guard duty. He 
and his fellow soldiers were supposed to be on duty for a maximum of twenty-four hours, but 
often, Zakharov would be on duty for several days at a time. 
 Eventually, Zakharov’s tribulation became too much for him, and, one day, he simply left 
his post. Instead of court-martialing him, his superiors reassigned him to a construction unit in 
Kunduz. There, his hardships continued. Zakharov was assigned to work on a construction crew 
building helicopter hangers. As they worked, the stariki would beat the laborers. Zakharov 
recalled, “They kept hitting us with belt buckles when we worked; you couldn’t even walk to the 
latrine, you had to run” (Rybakov 1983). Zakharov also reported that the more seasoned soldiers 
would take his rations, leaving him with very little food. Another time, an intoxicated sergeant 
told Zakharov that he did not do a good enough job cleaning the showers and then stabbed him 
with a bayonet. But the final straw for Zakharov came when one of his sergeants tried to force 
him to sleep with him. The sergeant told Zakharov, “I’ll give you money and cookies, and if you 
say one word to anyone, the elders [stariki] will cut your throat at night” (Rybakov 1983).  
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That same day, Zakharov escaped from his unit. He removed all of his clothing except his 
underwear and boots so he would not be recognizable as a Soviet soldier. He wandered for some 
time, not knowing where he was or where he wanted to go. Finally, he was taken in by some 
local Afghans who fed and clothed him, hid him from the Soviet authorities, and found him a 
Russian translator. His new Afghan family also gave him a Russian copy of the Koran, and 
Zakharov ultimately converted to Islam. After living in Afghanistan for several years, Zakharov 
reported that he had absolutely no intention of returning to the Soviet Union or finding his way 
to the West. Instead, he stated, “I am already a Moslem. I will live here, I’ll have a family, an 
Afghan wife, kids” (Rybakov 1983). 
Zakharov deserted his post for fairly obvious reasons; what is not so clear is why he 
decided to convert to Islam and live among the Afghan people. Zakharov left the Soviet Army 
because of the never-ending abuse he underwent from the beginning of his military service. This 
constant torment eventually became too much for the young soldier, and he escaped in search of 
some form of reprieve. In addition, Zakharov became highly disillusioned with the Red Army. 
He entered the military with the understanding that it would be an enjoyable and enlightening 
experience. Instead, he was faced with the stark reality of dedovshchina, and his opinion of the 
Soviet Union deteriorated. Nevertheless, despite his difficulties, it is impossible to know exactly 
what sparked Zakharov’s decision to become a Muslim. When he escaped the army, it was not 
with the intention of finding religion or a new way of life. He was not even looking for the 
Mujahedeen or another Afghan group. He was simply searching for some sort of relief. In this 
highly delicate psychological state, it is very likely that Zakharov would have been more 
susceptible to Stockholm syndrome or another form of traumatic bonding. He was undoubtedly 
suffering from psychological trauma. After experiencing so much abuse, the shock of humane 
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treatment from the Afghan locals may have sparked an emotional connection to his saviors, 
leading to his conclusion remain with the locals indefinitely.  
 
Sergei Zhigalin 
 Sergei Zhigalin was a former tractor driver from the Volgograd region of the USSR. 
After being drafted and sent to Afghanistan, he served as the driver of an armored personnel 
carrier. During his term in the Soviet Army, Zhigalin began to question the Soviet Union’s 
justification for invading Afghanistan. He resented being forced to fight in a time of peace, all 
the while being told that he was sent to “offer friendship and help to the Afghan people” and 
complete his “international duty” (Lapychak 1984). Zhigalin also complained of receiving brutal 
treatment from his officers, including unnecessary beatings and chastisement. He disliked being 
punished simply because he was a newer recruit, and he harbored feelings of resentment towards 
his superiors. He also disliked the rampant drug abuse throughout the ranks of the Soviet 
military. Finally, Zhigalin objected to the Soviet Union’s military tactics against Afghan 
civilians. He disagreed with these harsh military tactics and deserted the Red Army. He was 
captured by the Mujahedeen, but eventually gained asylum in the United States. 
 Zhigalin’s dissatisfaction with the Soviet Army was built upon a number of factors. To 
begin with, he did not feel that the USSR had a right to be in Afghanistan in the first place. He 
objected to the invasion of another country in a time of peace, and this protestation was only 
increased when he witnessed the mistreatment of Afghan civilians. Zhigalin was also dissatisfied 
with life within the army. The racism, drug abuse, and brutality of senior troops intensified his 
growing doubts and fears about the nature of the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan. Eventually, 
Zhigalin decided that he could not support such violence and oppression and deserted the army.  
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These case studies show that exposure to violence against non-combatants and the 
psychological trauma that ensued led these soldiers to defect from their country. Whether that 
was their initial intent or they came to the conclusion while in captivity, they all eventually 
defected in one form or another from their military service in the Soviet Army.  
 
CONCLUSION 
‘‘There is not a single Soviet soldier or officer left behind me. Our nine-year stay ends with 
this.’’ - Lieut. Gen. Boris V. Gromov, the commander of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan 
(Keller 1989) 
 
Afghanistan proved to be a tough battleground for the Soviet superpower. One third 
(7/21) of the documented captured or deserting soldiers defected to the Mujahedeen and actively 
took a role against the Soviet troops. The high level of defection was caused by the low morale 
that was commonplace among Soviet troops. This lack of drive was brought on by poor living 
conditions, inadequate military training, drug and alcohol abuse, and violent relationships 
between soldiers. Additionally, the level of animosity between Afghans and Soviets grew to 
insurmountable proportions. Widespread human rights violations offended some communist 
soldiers and further angered the Afghan population. In this dangerous, dynamic environment, 
paranoia was rampant, and capture became one of the greatest fears among the Red Army ranks. 
Many Soviet troops were in fact captured and held by the enemy. Others deliberately deserted 
their motherland’s army and sought refuge among the Mujahedeen. Their actions often arose 
from their dissatisfaction with army life, the mistreatment of Afghan civilians, and, in the case of 
Central Asian soldiers, their own cultural and ethnic ties to Afghan locals. Following Soviet 
withdrawal and the subsequent release of POWs, there were some ex-Soviets that chose to 
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remain among the local population instead of returning to the USSR. While the personal 
background of some POW/MIA soldiers played a role in their decision to remain, many were 
influenced by the historical treatment of Soviet POWs and the effects of psychological trauma. 
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